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I. INTRODUCTION
Making sense of divorce requires making sense of marriage.
Yet, while the legal literature abounds with publications about
the difficulties with modem divorce, it rarely mentions mar-
riage.I What is the role of marriage in the modem era? Does it
continue to involve a lifelong commitment? Does it depend on
the perpetuation of different roles assigned by gender? Should
marriage remain the principal focus of societal provisions for
childrearing? What is the role of the state in regulating this
most intimate of relationships?
This Article attempts to address these questions by working
backwards. With the decline in the importance of religion and
of the other societal and economic forces that made lifelong
unions central to the social order, there may be no accepted defi-
nition of marriage, but there is also no dearth of rules governing
divorce.2 What do those rules and the proposals to reform them
say about the nature of marriage?
In an effort to use divorce to examine marriage, this Article
draws on several disciplines. The first Part uses modem theories
of civil obligation, influenced by the insights of law and econom-
ics, to explain the significance of recent divorce reform. Econo-
mists approach civil liability as a system of incentives designed
to encourage or deter future behavior.3 While financial incen-
tives may not influence marital behavior to the extent that they
influence commercial behavior, divorce awards reinforce
1. For a comprehensive discussion of the literature that attempts to link marital roles
and divorce reform, see the discussion in Part III of this Article, infra. See generally M.
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); M. RHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW (1972); Hunter, An Essay on Contract
and Status: Race, Marriage and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1978);
Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1977).
2. See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 13-46; M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 1;
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 13-23 (1989); O'Connell, Alimony
After No-Fault" A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 437, 444-54
(1988); Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809-11 (1985); Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 10 (1990).
3. See generally R. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-5 (1990); M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1989); Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 527; Goldberg, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance
Markets: Comment on Danzon, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 565 (1984).
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selected marital ideals at a symbolic level.' Viewed in this light,
the abolition of fault, not only as a prerequisite for divorce but
also as a consideration in determining divorce awards, ushered
in a revolution in divorce jurisprudence. Divorce awards under
the old system served as a selective form of specific performance
dependent on the inviolability of marital obligations.5 Modem
awards, justified by need or lost career opportunities, deny the
existence of an obligation to remain married.6 The wisdom of
the resulting awards depends on the marital behavior to be
encouraged or deterred.
The second Part of this Article uses an historical approach
to explain the forces underlying divorce reform. This section
compares revisions in nineteenth- and twentieth-century family
law, explaining these revisions in terms of changes in the divi-
sion of labor. The nineteenth century, which witnessed the
transformation of much of the country from an agrarian to an
industrial society, involved both greater specialization among
men to supply the needs of the emerging industrial economy and
an increasingly rigid division between the male world of the
market and the female world of the home.7 The latter part of
the twentieth century has involved the transformation from a
manufacturing to a service ecomony-increasing the demand for
women workers.' Specialization among women, who were once
limited to the relatively undifferentiated role of homemaker, is
now matching specialization among men as even married mid-
dle-class mothers join their husbands in the labor market, hiring
other women to satisfy the family's domestic needs.9
The third Part of this Article uses the relationships between
divorce proposals and the division of labor within marriage to
critique the existing theoretical perspectives. This section dem-
onstrates that the traditionalist approach to marriage champi-
oned by Chicago School economists like Gary Becker depends
on the argument that one spouse, preferably the wife, should
bear the primary childrearing role. According to this approach
the only way to encourage such a division of responsibilities is to
4. For an excellent description of the role of the law in influencing marital behavior,
see Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217 (1990).
5. See Brinig & Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 855, 883-84 (1988).
6. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
9. See id.
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tie the financial consequences of divorce to the performance of
relatively traditional roles.1° In contrast, liberal feminists, led by
Henna Hill Kay, caution against the expansion of divorce
awards. They believe that women will achieve substantial equal-
ity only when they become financially independent, and that
society must withdraw its support for traditional marital roles if
this is to occur." In between 2 are two other groups. The first
group argues for a divorce award system tied to compensation
for lost career opportunities. This system is designed to
encourage married women both to remain in the labor market
and to bear the primary responsibility for childrearing.13 Sec-
ondly, a newer group of feminists, employing an expanded part-
nership approach, argues that the childrearing role should be
made less perilous without penalizing women's decisions either
to value family more than career or to leave a particular
marriage.14
The Article concludes that to resolve these issues, to com-
plete a vision of the future of marriage, requires examining not
only the relationship between men and women, but also that
between marriage and children. Feminists, divided on the
degree to which men and women's roles should differ, should
nonetheless be able to agree on the need to separate support for
childrearing from the continuation of existing marriages.
Should such a separation occur, however, it will mark a new
beginning, not an end, for the rethinking of marriage.
10. G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981). See generally Cohen,
Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rent" Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My .Lfe," 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987); Ellman, supra note 2; Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 35 (1978).
11. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L. Rav. 1, 80, 85 (1987).
12. Martha Fineman, as early as 1983, decried the limitation of the existing debate to
what she characterized as two models treating women either as "equal," and therefore to be
presumed economically independent, or as "victim." Fineman, Implementing Equality:
Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the
Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 789, 814.
13. See generally Carbone, Economics Feminism and the Reinvention of Alimony or
Why the Desire to Remove Distorting Incentives Does Not a Theory Make, 43 VAND. L.
RFv. 1463 (1990); Ellman, supra note 2; Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal
Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989).
14. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 498-500, 507-08; Smith, The Partnership Theory
of Marriage A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REv. 689, 730-43 (1990).
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II. WHAT DIVORCE REFORM MEANS: THE APPLICATION
OF THEORIES OF CIVIL LIABILITY TO THE FAMILY
The legal aspects of marriage have long been treated as a
world of their own, separate from any practical or theoretical
connection to theories of liability in other fields. This division
occurred partly for historical reasons-the rules governing mari-
tal separations developed before modem contract and tort theo-
ries, and they developed in a separate system of courts-and
partly because, under the influence of formalism, theories of civil
obligation focused on the prerequisites for liability.15 Modem
theory, influenced by the insights of law and economics, has
shifted its focus from liability's prerequisites to its conse-
quences.1 6 Although traditional contract analysis, for example,
may have asked whether marital obligations are sufficiently defi-
nite or sufficiently voluntary to constitute enforceable agree-
ments,1 7 modem scholars examine the incentives supplied by
contract remedies.' The result is to focus attention on the poli-
cies that divorce awards are designed to promote.
In analyzing marriage as a form of civil obligation, and in
identifying the policies that are served by modem divorce law,
the most striking observation is the identification of the interests
that are not protected.' 9 Marriage historically involved the life-
long exchange of the husband's support for the wife's services in
a union consecrated by God and unalterable by the parties.20
Fault-the requirement that one party, and only one party, egre-
giously violate the canons of marriage-served to identify those
cases in which one party had so flouted his or her marital obliga-
15. For a discussion of the origins of divorce jurisprudence, see Vernier & Hurlbut,
The Historical Background of 4limony Law and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoas. 197 (1939); O'Connell, supra note 2, at 444-83. For a discussion of
formalism, see M. HOROwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
253-66 (1977); 1L KELSO & C. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 79 (1983).
16. See generally M. POLINSKY, supra note 3; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2d ed. 1977); Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 299 (1985); Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle" Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967 (1983).
17. For a recent example of this type of analysis, see Ellman, supra note 2. Cf
Carbone, supra note 13.
18. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Ellman, supra note 2, at 51-52 (claiming
that an alimony theory that considers incentives is "noncontractual").
19. For a more complete examination of marriage as a system of civil obligation, see
Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5; Carbone, supra note 13.
20. On the religious origins of marriage law, see O'Connell, supra note 2, at 444-51;
De Luca, The New Law on Marriage, 30 CATH. LAw. 70 (1985); see also Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 5, at 883 & n. 115; sources cited supra note 2.
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tions that the other party deserved to be released from the obli-
gations of a relationship that had effectively ceased to exist." As
a prerequiste for divorce, fault became obsolete once society rec-
ognized the right of an unhappy couple to terminate its union.
But the recognition of no-fault grounds for ending the marriage
did not necessarily mean that either party could choose to leave
with impunity. The law could still recognize marriage as a con-
tract whose breach gave rise to liability.22
Most states, however, have not done so. In adopting no-
fault grounds for divorce, many states have precluded considera-
tion of marital misconduct altogether.3 Without identification
of the party responsible for the end of the marriage, the commit-
ment to remain married becomes unenforceable. In traditional
civil terms, neither the expectation interest (the standard of liv-
ing made possible by the marriage) nor the reliance interest (sac-
rifices made in the belief the marriage will last) can be
protected.24 Economists would argue that such a result makes
sense only to the degree that the costs imposed by a determina-
tion that marital obligations have been breached exceed the
interests to be protected by an expectation or reliance
21. 2 J. BISHOP, NEw COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
§ 1452 (1891); see also Setaro, A History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U.L. REv. 102,
121-23 (1938); M. RHEINSTEN, supra note 1.
22. Indeed, a number of states continue to permit consideration of the reasons for the
divorce in the determination of financial awards. For a fuller examination of the role of
marital misconduct in determining divorce awards, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at
870-82, 884-87, 894-902.
23. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 887 n.132; Kay, supra note 11, at 72-74 &
n.363.
24. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) adopts the following
definitions:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made.
Neither the expectation interest nor the reliance interest can be protected in the
absence of (1) an agreement to remain married and (2) a determination that the paying
party is responsible for the other's loss. For a fuller examination of this issue, see Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 5, at 875-76 & n.89.
There has been considerable confusion on this point because the modern trend is to
justify spousal support in terms of lost career opportunities, a reliance measure. To the
degree, however, that lost career opportunities are compensated only when there is a corre-
sponding gain to the other party such as children or enhanced earning potential, the justifi-
cation is a restitution and not a reliance measure. See id. at 876 n.89; see also Carbone,
supra note 13, at 1476-80.
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standard.25
Such an analysis has never been undertaken with any rigor.
While the costs of a fault determination are deemed self-evident
.y anyone familiar with the older system, the costs of a no-fault
system have not been weighed against the possible benefits of a
more expansive system of divorce awards.26 The benefits are
those traditionally identified with civil obligation-deterring
breach and encouraging reliance over the life of the relation-
ship.27 Within marriage, deterring breach translates into lower
divorce rates. Encouraging reliance primarily means encourag-
ing the career sacrifices women have traditionally made in the
interests of their families. 28 A decision to preclude consideration
of marital misconduct could be justified, therefore, either on the
ground that the cost of the determination has increased or
because of a conclusion that the interests to be served by such a
determination (primarily the interests associated with perpetuat-
ing traditional marital roles) are not as important as they once
25. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 898. For an economic discussion of the
interests served by expectation and reliance awards, see M. POLINSxY, supra note 3, at 27-
34; Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1432, 1467-75
(1985); Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: A Positive Economic FraMework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541, 544-45 (1988).
26. A modem system that considered marital misconduct would not be identical to
the older fault system because such a finding would not be a prerequisite for divorce.
Courts would accordingly still be free to: (1) find that both parties or neither party was to
blame; (2) award support to a blameworthy party on a restitution basis; and (3) develop
relatively more gender-neutral definitions of marital misconduct. Nonetheless, such an
inquiry would still involve an inquiry into the relationship between the couple, the
commission of adultery, and other such factors. For a further discussion of this issue, see
Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 896-98.
27. Fuller and Perdue argued that the justification for use of expectation damages is
to deter breach and encourage reliance over the course of the contract. Fuller & Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 60-61, 373
(1936).
Modem economists go beyond Fuller and Perdue, justifying expectation primarily in
terms of the need to deter inefficient breach, that is, breach in which the losses exceed the
gains. See, e-g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 90. Economists also note that expectation,
unlike restitution, encourages not just efficient reliance, but overreliance on performance of
the contract. See M. POLINSKY, supra note 3, at 34-37; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 25,
at 1465. These economists conclude that the choice between expectation and restitution
depends on which concern, inefficient breach or inefficient reliance, is greater. M.
POLINSKY, supra note 3, at 38. For a more extended application of these concepts to
marriage, see Carbone, supra note 13, at 1485-88.
Modem economists also argue that when expectation and reliance differ, expectation
measures will deter inefficient breach more effectively, but that reliance measures, like
expectation ones, will encourage overreliance over the course of the contract. Cooter &
Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 1468.
28. See Landes, supra note 8, at 35; Ellman, supra note 2, at 40-48; Carbone, supra
note 13, at 1489-90.
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were.29 Either way, the interests sacrificed must be considered
along with the costs. The difficulty of determining fault should
not be used to cloak important societal decisions about the
nature of marriage.
Once a state has precluded consideration of marital miscon-
duct, the law of civil obligation also helps to define the interests
that remain. Again, application of traditional civil terms leads
to the conclusion that, while contract and tort remedies depend
on a determination of breach of contract or breach of duty, resti-
tution does not. Contract and tort require such a determination
in order to justify imposition of one party's loss upon the other.
Restitution requires only that one party gain at the other's
expense in circumstances in which it would be unjust to allow
retention of the gain without payment. 30 Within marriage, resti-
tution is therefore possible whenever the divorce separates gains
and losses that would otherwise be shared.31  Economists
observe that the decision to provide compensation-that is, to
reach a legal conclusion that retention of the benefit is unjust
rather than a conclusion that the benefit has been gratuitously
rendered-involves a decision to encourage these forms of
exchange.32
29. We argue later in this Article that there are two important justifications for
precluding consideration of fault that are independent of the difficulty of making the
determination. First, tying the financial consequences of divorce to a determination that
marital obligations have been breached serves to reinforce traditional gender roles,
encouraging women to think in terms of marriage rather than the market for their financial
well-being. See sources cited infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text. Second, a fault
system makes it more difficult for the lower earning, rather than the higher earning, spouse
to decide to end a marriage. See sources cited infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text;
see also Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORiDHAM
L. REv. 539, 541 (1990).
30. G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REOrrurioN § 1.7 (1978). For a discussion of the
role of restitution in marriage, see Carbone, supra note 13, at 14-22; Casad, Unmarried
Couples and Unjust Enrichment From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 47 (1978); Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. Rv. 379, 386 (1980).
31. If husband and wife decide, for example, to have the wife quit her job rather than
hire a nanny, both parents will share the benefit from the care provided for the children,
but only the wife will bear the continuing loss. Similarly, to take an equally stereotyped
example, if the wife contributes to the husband's medical education, and the divorce occurs
shortly after he graduates, he will have the sole benefit fiom an investment the couple
jointly undertook and paid for. See Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 386. See generally
Krauskopf, supra note 13.
32. On the incentives supplied by restitution damages, see generally M. POUNSKY,
supra note 3, at 33-38; Katz, supra note 25, at 556-60.
Restitution recoveries are narrower than expectation or reliance recoveries in part
because they focus on selected transactions, not on the marriage as a whole. A reliance
960 [Vol. 65
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Translated into the language of civil obligation, the existing
divorce system has largely rejected contract and tort, expecta-
tion and reliance, in favor of restitution. 3 Marriage as a lifelong
commitment is gone, with expanding protection for particular
exchanges made while the marriage lasted.34 Nothing within
existing civil theory, however, provides a basis for considering
the wisdom of these developments, for deciding that the costs of
determining whether marital obligations have been breached
exceeds the benefits gained from deterring divorce, or for decid-
ing to support a mother who quits her existing job to care for her
children, but not one who majored in home economics rather
than accounting before she married. To critique these develop-
ments, indeed, even to explain them fully, requires a broader
view of the origins of divorce policy.
HI. WHY DIVORCE REFORM OCCURS: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
LABOR MARKET AND GENDER ROLES
In the evolution of American divorce and property rules,
there are two major reform periods. The first period centers on
the nineteenth-century enactment of the Married Women's
Property Acts. The second period is the twentieth-century "no-
fault" movement. Both reform periods are explicable largely in
terms of a paradigm shift in the relationship between husband
and wife. The nineteenth-century reforms involved a change in
marriage from what Nancy Cott has described as a form of
standard, for example, would ask the question: what would the wife's earning capacity
have been had she not relied primarily on her husband's income for her well-being? A
restitution standard asks the question, "To what extent is the wife bearing a
disproportionate share of the cost of having children?"
33. In discussing divorce awards in terms of civil obligation, this analysis is limited to
a discussion of adjustments made after the initial division of property between the spouses.
Such adjustments usually take the form of spousal support. For further discussion of this
issue, see infra note 202.
34. See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9-96. The degree of protection
provided is limited by the theory of liability. To the extent that the husband's otherwise
incalculable benefit from the children is measured by the cost necessary to raise them, that
cost involves the wife's foregone earning potential from the particular decisions the couple
made as they raised the children. The wife's overall potential, however, is the sum of a
series of decisions-to complete college, to accept a transfer, to enter a training program, to
switch to a job with more flexible hours-all of which may have been made in the
anticipation that her marital role would be more important than her career development.
An expectation measure (the standard of living made possible by the marriage) or a reliance
measure (the position she would have been in had she not married) would allow a larger
part of that lost potential to be taken into account. Restitution limits consideration of lost
earning potential to that potential lost at the time a particular exchange was made.
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indentured servitude3s to an ideal of complementarity, 36 empha-
sizing the separation of public and private spheres and affection
rather than obedience as the basis of the marital order.37 The
twentieth-century changes, still far from complete, are part of an
assault on the ideal of complementarity in the name of equal-
ity.38 In both cases, the legal reforms were instruments of social
change, facilitating a reorganization of gender roles by adjusting
the incentives for marital behavior and reinforcing, at a symbolic
level, the new marital ideals. a9
The nineteenth-century changes, according to the most
commonly accepted historical accounts, 40 accompanied growing
industrialization in the United States. The marital and property
systems that the American colonists had brought with them
from England were feudal in origin.4 ' Professor Donohue
35. Nancy Cott describes the relationship between husband and wife as "a contract
between unequals with disparate obligations.... [ Marriage resembled an indenture
between master and servant.... The husband's obligation was unequivocal .... The wife
performed her part in subjection. Like a servant in relation to a master, she contributed
continual service and received support." Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women
in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586, 611-12 (1976).
Cott's analogy is a loose one. Indentured servants, unlike married women, could hold
property, make contracts, and sue the master for failure to abide by the indenture contract.
See generally D. GALENSON, WHITE SERVrrUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1981); S. INNEs, WORK AND LABOR N EARLY AMERICA (1988).
36. Nancy Cott used the term "complementarity" to refer to the what she terms a
preoccupation "with the reciprocal obligations and advantages of the sexes." Cott, supra
note 35, at 613. She does not appear to use the term in its strict economic sense of two
independent factors indispensable in the production of a third item, such as the use of tin
and lead to make pewter. See H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 103 (1986).
37. Cott, supra note 35, at 613-14; see also W. CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY:
CHANGING PATIERNS N AMERICAN CULTURE 26 (1977); M. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN
AMERICA 113-65 (1975). On the role of affection in marriage, see M. LABARGE, A SMALL
SOUND OF THE TRUMPET: WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL LIFE at xii (1986); R. PHILLPS,
PurING ASUNDER 358 (1988).
38. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 789; cf Kay, supra note 11.
39. In examining changes in gender roles, we will be concentrating on the ideal, and
primarily the middle-class ideal, rather than on an effort to describe actual relationships.
In emphasizing the increased importance, for example, of affection over obedience as the
basis of the marital order, we do not mean to suggest that affection did not exist between
married couples during earlier periods. Rather, we are saying that the fact that affection
was accorded relatively greater importance in the popular literature of that period provided
symbolic reinforcement of changes that were taking place in marital relationships. On the
role of affection generally, see Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for
Rights, 11 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 625 (1988).
40. See generally Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REv.
1135 (recounting the standard interpretations of nineteenth-century family history).
41. The states colonized by the Spanish and French adopted community-law systems.
See generally Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 61 WASH. L. Rlv. 13
(1986); Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. RPv. 20 (1967). Professor Donohue notes, however, that "the adoption in the
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explains the thirteenth-century origins of that system in terms of
the English need to keep landed estates intact and under the
authority of a single member of the next generation.42 English
marriage law, as Mary Ann Glendon's work demonstrates, mir-
rored the property rules and treated husband and wife as "one
person in the law,"'43 united under the husband's authority.44
The unavailability of divorce and the reinforcement of the hus-
band's power, like the common-law property system, served to
keep estates intact and within the control of a single member of
the family.4 5
While hereditary estates were less important in early
America than in feudal England,46 the symbolic union of hus-
nineteenth century of community property by eight of our western states and the retention
of separate property by the remainder of the American states may not tell us anything
about the societies and institutions of those states. Both ideas were quite well developed at
the time they were adopted in America." Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal
Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 59, 60 (1979) (emphasis in original).
42. In Professor Donahue's words, the English system "exhibited a great drive
toward unifying control in one person and passing what he had intact to a single member of
the next generation." Donahue, supra note 41, at 81; see also Castleberry, Constitutional
Limits on the Division of Property upon Divorce, 10 ST. MARY'S L.. 37, 55 (1989); Vaughn,
supra note 41, at 35; Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law
Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269, 1271-72 (1981).
With wealth and status often dependent on inheritance, legitimacy was of major
importance. According to Blackstone, marriage had one critical socioeconomic function:
the creation of lawful heirs. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358, *402. Frederick
Engels evaluated the monogamous patriarchal family-genuine monogamy demanded only
of women-as an oppressive arrangement that ensured the legitimacy of children for
patrilineal descent, while turning women into the first exploited class. F. ENGELS, THE
ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 65-67 (E.B. Leacock ed.
1972). See generally N. BAscH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN MARRIAGE AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE § XII (1889); C. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 13-36 (1989).
43. According to Blackstone, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in
law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything; ... and her condition during
the marriage is called her coverture." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *442 (emphasis
in original).
44. M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 17.
45. Upon marriage, husbands acquired the right to manage and control their wives'
separate property and any resulting profits. E. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, at 9 (1987). If he alienated the lands without
her permission, however, she could regain them at his death. See M. SALMON, WOMEN
AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 13 (1986).
46. The feudal warranty system, which had largely disappeared in England by the
eighteenth century, never took root in the United States. Land was far more plentiful, and
often more readily available by acquest than by inheritance. Primogeniture was quickly
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band and wife under the husband's authority continued to serve
the interests of an agrarian society.4 7 At the same time, the
courts were able to alleviate pressures for reform by finding ways
around the law's inconveniences.48 So long as property
remained the major source of income, with ownership concen-
trated in husbands and their sons,4 9 few financial opportunities
existed for women outside of marriage.50 The husband's domin-
ion extended over both the commercial and the domestic
abolished, underscoring the fact that the colonists had never been as concerned as their
English forbears with keeping estates intact. M. SALMoN, supra note 45, at 7; E.
WARBASSE, supra note 45, at 24-27.
47. The central characteristic of this system was the submersion of the wife's legal
identity into her husband's. Upon marriage, the wife lost the ability to enter into contracts,
buy or sell land without her husband's consent, sue or be sued, or even make a will. The
husband had the right to control and manage his wife's land and to use any profits accruing
from the property. Upon the wife's death, if the wife bore the husband a child alive, the
husband, by right of curtesy, acquired a life estate in his wife's property, the remainder
passing to her heirs. The wife acquired, at her husband's death, a life estate in one third of
his property. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 288 (2d ed. 1987); see also E.
WARBASSE, supra note 45, at 9.
Although community-property states differed considerably in theory, they varied little
in practice, at least while the two spouses were alive. Community property, defined to
include most of the property acquired during the marriage, was held by husband and wife
jointly, but the husband alone in most states had the right to manage the property during
the marriage. Accordingly, while common-law and community-property states differed in
their disposition of a spouse's estate at death, they resulted in similar patterns during the
life of the marriage. See Vaughn, supra note 41, at 37-38.
48. The major difficulty that the traditional English system presented was the
difficulty in selling land, given the wife's lack of power over her own property and her
inchoate dower interest in her husband's. American law devised ways around such
obstacles without changing the underlying system. See, e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 42, at
23-24.
49. In the United States, land was much more freely available than it had been in
England, and primogeniture never became as important here as it had been in England.
Nonetheless, farmers often tried to keep the family farm intact, leaving it to a single son on
the condition that he support his widowed mother or sisters from the proceeds. See e.g.,
N. BASCH, supra note 42, at 105-08. Land ownership and control continued to be vested
primarily in men, with many men leaving the realty to their sons and cash bequests to their
daughters or placing unfettered control in their sons, while establishing trusts for their
daughters. This pattern continued well into the nineteenth century. See Chused, Married
Women's Property Laws 1800-1850, 71 GEo. LJ. 1359, 1364, 1382 (1983).
50. See M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 13-17, 102-08 (discussing the relationship
between family law and property). Of course, this varied for different groups at different
times. There is some indication that in the colonies and on the frontier, women had greater
financial opportunities. See Norton, The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early
America, 89 AM. HIST. REv. 593 (1984); L. ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY
IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650-1750, at 13-50 (1982)
(indicating that women participated in a separate world of female exchange in which
women often generated substantial income as midwives, weavers, cheesemakers, and the
like). But see G. RILEY, THE FEMALE FRONTIER 2 (1988) (concluding that frontier
women generally performed the same roles that women did in the East).
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spheres, as married couples lived and worked side by side." The
husband might have primary responsibility for the shop or the
farm, but the wife was available to help with the harvest or to
restock the shelves5 2 The wife might provide the primary care
for the younger children, but the husband had a major role in
the training and supervision of older children, especially the
training of boys expected to follow in their father's footsteps.5 3
While the feudal system of land tenure-and the emphasis on
arranged marriages and primogeniture that had accompanied
it-had long since disappeared, the law continued to airm the
hierarchical nature of marriage.54  This was justified by the
inherent inferiority of women55 and was economically based on
the husband's control of the family's income-producing assets.5 6
Industrialization, under way in the Eastern United States at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, brought with it a sub-
51. [Ihe colonial household was hierarchical, patriarchal, and vested with
overlapping and undifferentiated internal and external obligations. The
community charged each male governor with the duty of maintaining a well-
governed home and sustained his authority by granting him control of its
inhabitants as well as of family property and other resourses.
M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THEHEARTH 5 (1985); see also W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at
17.
52. As Martha Minow noted, women were more willing to help with the farm or the
store than men were to assist with "women's work." Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 854-56.
Nonetheless, the separation into domestic and commercial "spheres," as opposed to male
and female "activities," came later. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
53. Indeed, the father, not the mother, had primary authority over the children and
he had statutory authority to name a guardian in his will to oversee the care of minor
children and their property. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 184 (1896); see also McCant, The
Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127 (1987); Zainaldin, The
Emergence of a Modern American Family Law, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038, 1052-
68 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1135, 1139-40.
55. See A. FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL 1-6 (1984); N. CoTr, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 201-04 (1977); E.
WARBASSE, supra note 45, at 79; Bloch, Untangling the Roots of Modern Sex Roles: A
Survey of Four Centuries of Change, 4 SIGNS 237, 240-41 (1978). As late as 1911, the
Virginia Supreme Court reiterated that "notwithstanding the advances made by modern
women towards political and economic independence of man, it still remains true that the
normal woman married to the normal man recognizes the obligation of obedience
contained in the marriage vow, and observes the Pauline injunction to remain subject to her
husband .... ." Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 661-62, 91 S.E. 632,
634 (1917).
56. In Norma Basch's words, "Marriage, after all, was also a social arrangement
between the sexes in which the distribution of property was inextricably connected to the
allocation of power." N. BASCH, supra note 42, at 38. It is interesting to note in this respect
that, at least in the United States, the community-property states were no different from the
common-law states, with both giving the husband the primary power to manage the family
and family property. See sources cited supra note 47.
TULANE LAW REVIEW
stantial reorganization of gender roles, making the older symbol-
ism inappropriate. Farming had made marriage an
interdependent economic enterprise. Wives were dependent on
the land that their husbands controlled, and husbands were
dependent on the labor of their wives and children. Industriali-
zation severed the commercial from the domestic.5 7 In an agra-
rian society fathers could run the farm or the shop and oversee
the household, and mothers could care for the children and con-
tribute to the economy. Industrial workers, in contrast, were
forced to choose where to concentrate their energies."8 At the
same time, an industrial economy created a demand for different
types of workers. Farmers performed relatively undifferentiated
roles learned through on-the-job training from their parents.59
The industrial age required, in addition to large pools of the rela-
tively unskilled, a new class of better educated managers and
professionals, and a wider variety of skilled technicians. For the
middle class, these changes meant pay scales high enough to
reward investm'ent in education and training, greater parental
commitment to the care and education of children,6" and greater
57. As in precapitalist society, throughout most of capitalist history the family
has been the basic unit of "economic" production-not the "wage-earning"
father, but the household as a whole. While there was an intense division of labor
within the family, based upon age, sex, and family position, there was scarcely a
division between the family and the world of commodity production, at least not
until the nineteenth century. With the rise of, industry, capitalism "split"
material production between its socialized forms (the sphere of commodity
production) and the private labor performed predominately by women within the
home. In this form, male supremacy, which long antedated capitalism, became
an institutional part of the capitalist system of production.
E. ZARETSKY, CAPrrAUSM, THE FAMILY, AND PERSONAL LiFE 28-29 (1976); see also N.
COTT, supra note 55, at 67-68; C. MAcIrNNON, supra note 42, at 13-39; Olsen, The Family
and the Market, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983); Teitelbaum, supra note 39, at
1140; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797, 811-12 (1989).
58. This was true partly because of the physical separation between home and job and
partly because of the long and inflexible hours demanded. See E. ZARETSKY, supra note
57, at 28-31; UNr[ED STATES DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISToRICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNrED STATES (pt. 2), at 169 (1975) (indicating that factory workers
averaged over 100 hours per week of employment until 1890).
59. Men and women, of course, played different roles, but the role of one farmer to
another or one wife to another required relatively little specialization. See E. ZARETSKY,
supra note 57, at 28-29; Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1141. On the importance of role
differentiation and specialization in the production of wealth, see A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTo THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 1, ch. 2 (London
1776); L. VON MISES, HUMAN ACrION 157-59 (1949).
60. Brownlee and Brownlee write that teaching lacked a fundamental counterpart in
the pre-industrial world. They observe:
But the late Victorians elaborated on the reality of the nuclear family to increase
the specialization of household work and to emphasize the family's patriarchal
quality. To an extent, the preferences of the Victorians were appropriate to the
966 [Vol. 65
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emphasis on the social skills necessary to work within larger
institutions.61
The nineteenth-century solution to these new demands was
a redefinition of gender roles. The older order, which coupled
the husband's property ownership with the wife's duty to obey,
was premised on the inherent inferiority of women, their greater
susceptibility to temptation, and their immature and childlike
qualities.62 The new ideal, called by some "the cult of true
womanhood," celebrated women's. nobler virtues. 3 In the
forces of economic modernization. The increased Victorian emphasis on
education, within as well as without the family, represented an effort to increase
society's investment in "human capital." Perpetuating a middle-class life style-
the product of skills deemed valuable by the wider society-or raising lower-class
children to middle-class status in fact required an increased diversion of society's
energies to child rearing.
W. BROWNLEE & M. BROWNLEE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HIsrORY, 1675 TO 1929, at 26 (1976).
Mary Ryan details the way in which education fit into what she calls "an elaborate
and largely successful strategy for reproducing the middle class." She observes:
As Utica began to industrialize, the native born evaded the clutches of the facto-
ries, avoided unskilled day labor, kept skilled trades and small shops afloat, and in
significant numbers entered the ranks of professionals and white-collar employ-
ees. The sequence of tactics that they employed to this end can be summarized as
follows. Prescient native-born couples began in the 1830s to limit their family
size, thereby concentrating scarce financial and emotional resources on the care
and education of fewer children. Second, as indicated by the popular childbear-
ing literature circulating through Utica beginning in the 1830s, native-born Prot-
estant parents initiated methods of socialization designed to inculcate values and
traits of character deemed essential to middle-class achievement and respectabil-
ity. Next, native-born parents tended to keep their children within the house-
holds of their birth for extended periods, often until their sons were well over
twenty years of age. By this strategy, mothers and fathers prolonged their moral
surveillance and material support of the second generation even as it advanced
out of the home into the labor force. At the same time, the parental generation
had created the educational institutions and financed the schooling that qualified
their children for more skilled and lucrative occupations.
M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW
YORK, 1790-1865, at 184-85 (1981). Ryan concludes that much of this effort was under-
taken by women. IAt at 185.
61. With industrialization, class differences also became more pronounced. For a
discussion of changing class relationships, and the role of women in creating and
reproducing the new middle class, see W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 21-24; M. RYAN, supra
note 37, at 116-19; M. RYAN, supra note 60, at 145-85. Nonetheless, the interest in
promoting education was not limited to the upper and middle classes, although public
education did not become widespread until later in the century. See Teitelbaum, supra
note 40, at 1149-57.
62. See generally A. FRASER, supra note 55; 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 27 (M.
Wortman ed. 1985).
63. The attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman judged herself and
was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society could be divided into four
cardinal virtues-piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity. Put them all
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increasingly commercialized world of the nineteenth century,
women were to preserve the home as a refuge where altruism
would prevail over greed, where piety and conscience could
flourish.64 The "male" sphere of the market was set in opposi-
tion to the "female" sphere of the family. As Frances Olsen con-
cluded, this "dichotomy tended to exclude women from the
world of the marketplace while promising them a central role in
the supposedly equally important domestic sphere. '65
The new ideology encouraged married middle-class women
to stay home and to assume a different array of responsibilities
within the family. Over the course of the nineteenth century,
not only were the earlier sources of production-the farm and
the shop-being replaced by production outside the home, but
many traditional domestic activities-for example, spinning and
weaving-were being rendered unnecessary by the expanding
market.6 At the same time, women had more opportunities,
together and they spelled mother, daughter, sister, wife-woman. Without them,
no matter whether there was fame, achievement or wealth, all was ashes. With
them she was promised happiness and power.
Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood. 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 152 (1966).
64. N. CoTr, supra note 55, at 67-71; Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1142. Welter,
reviewing the women's magazines and related literature of the day, concluded: "By careful
manipulation and interpretation they sought to convince woman that she had the best of
both worlds-power and virtue-and that a stable order of society depended upon her
maintaining her traditional place in it. To that end she was identified with everything that
was beautiful and holy." Welter, supra note 63, at 174.
65. Olsen, supra note 57, at 1500; see also M. RYAN, THE EMPIRE OF THE MOTHER:
AMERICAN WRmING ABouT DOMESrIcrrY 1830-1860, at 97 (1982). Ryan observes:
The 1850's saw two icons-the isolated home and the imperial mother-installed
at the center of popular discourse. In ideology, at least, it was possible to devise a
domestic physics that placed the family in a close and narrow social space and at
the same time put its cloistered female occupant at the helm of an empire.
Id
Justice Bradley drew on the ideal of separate spheres to uphold the exclusion of
women from the Illinois bar:
On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timid-
ity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband.
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
66. N. COTT, supra note 55, at 36-37. Nancy Cott observes: 'he more densely
populated and commercially advanced an area, the greater was families' reliance on
purchasing power and money income, and the less the need for wives' household
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albeit dramatically fewer than those available to men, for self-
support. 7 If middle-class women were to remain home, their
domestic activities needed to be redefined. The new ideology
contributed to the redefinition by exalting motherhood.6 8 Nancy
Cott describes the transformation:
More than ever before in New England history, the care of
children appeared to be mothers' sole work and the work of
mothers alone. The expansion of nonagricultural occupations
drew men and grown children away from the household, abbre-
viating their presence in the family and their roles in child rear-
ing. Mothers and young children were left in the household
together just when educational and religious dicta both newly
emphasized the malleability of young minds. Enlightenment
psychology drew tighter the connection between early influence
on the child and his or her eventual character, just as mothers'
influence on young children appeared more salient.6 9
In the agricultural communities of early America, childrearing
had been simply another of the household activities taking place
manufacture; the greater the ramifications of business outside the household and the less
within it." Id. at 50. Ryan concludes that "[w]omen's assignments in the traditional
household economy were actually among the first productive activities to be transferred to
the factory: the spinning of yarn was industrialized long before the planting of corn." M.
RYAN, supra note 37, at 119.
67. The early mills and factories hired women as well as men. See M. RYAN, supra
note 37, at 119-25. Researchers have found that in cities like Baltimore as many as 40% of
the women worked.. W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 22. In the textile mill towns, the
percentage of women working was higher still. T. DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK 27 (1979).
The growing interest in education also increased the demand for teachers, and the
expansion of the market increased the opportunity to sell the products women traditionally
produced at home. See N. CoTr, supra note 55, at 30-34.
68. See C. BEECHER, TREATISE ON DoMESTIc ECONOMY, FOR THE USE OF YOUNG
LADIES AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL 13 (1841) ("It is equally conceded, that the formation
of the moral and intellectual character of the young is committed mainly to the female
hand.... The proper education of a man decides the welfare of an individual; but educate
a woman, and the interests of a whole family are secured."); M. RYAN, supra note 65, at 94
(quoting the 1851 Advocate of Moral Reform)(" 'We need more and more of the female
influence. What can surpass it? What tyranny of evil can stand before it...? We need it in
the nursery, where mothers can imbue the minds of children with temperance principles.
We need it in childhood and youth when a mother's example, and a mother's warning and
kind monition, are like a golden chain. We need it in society, in the social circle and even
in the business of life, wherever woman reigns supreme.' ").
69. N. CoTT, supra note 55, at 46 (footnotes omitted); see also M. RYAN, supra note
60, at 185; Bridges, Family Patterns and Social Values in America; 1825-1875, 17 AM. Q. 3,
9-10 (1965); Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1142.
Consistent with the expansion of the domestic role and the emphasis on woman's
nobler virtues was an increased emphasis on volunteer activities. See Smith-Rosenberg,
Beauty, the Beast and the Militant Woman, in A HERITAGE OF HER OwN: TOWARD A
NEW SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 216 (N. Cott & E. Pleck eds. 1979); S.
ROTHMAN, WOMAN's PROPER PLACE 42 (1978).
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alongside the harvest, the hunting, the curing, and the weaving.
In the new industrial age, childrearing became the middle-class
household's reason for being.70
The nineteenth-century legal reforms took place within the
framework set by the new ideology. Enactment of the Married
Women's Property Acts, though perhaps prompted by the utility
of protecting married women's property from their husbands'
creditors during times of economic uncertainty, embraced the
symbolism of complementarity.71 Married women, mistresses of
the idealized domestic realm, could now retain control of their
separate property, enter contracts, write wills, sue, and be
sued. 2 Upon divorce or their husband's death, they received
their share of the property in fee simple.73 Women who fore-
70. The differences between middle-class women and working-class women were
dramatic. Chafe reports:
By the end of the 19th century, therefore, a clear line had been drawn between the
appropriate activities of "proper" white middle-class women and the activities
associated with black, poor, and immigrant women. For the first time in the
nation's history, women from the former group were not centrally involved in
what the dominant culture defined as mainstream economic activities. Their less-
well-off sisters, by contrast, provided a major source of cheap and marginal labor.
The results were dramatically apparent in the 1900 census, which showed that 41
per cent of all non-white women were employed, while only 17 per cent of white
women worked, most of them from immigrant stock.
W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 23.
71. Like many reform movements, the movement supporting property law reform
operated at several different levels over the course of more than half a century. In some
states, passage came during business panics and allowed the states to provide some relief
from creditors. For a discussion of the economic conditions underlying passage of the
reform statutes, see N. BASCH, supra note 42, at 114-15, 123-26; M. BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 112-13 (1976); L.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 186 (1973); K. LAzARou, CONCEALED
UNDER PETTICOATS: MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY AND THE LAWS OF TEXAS, 1840-
1913, at 35-39 (1986); P. RABKN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FEMALE EMANCIPATION 154-55 (1980); Chused, supra note 49, at 1400-04.
The contemporaneous debates, however, whether at the time the first statutes were
enacted in the 1830s or at the time of the last ones enacted in the 1870s, focused very much
on the effect such statutes would have on family stability and order. Opponents of the
reform legislation emphasized the continued need to reinforce the husband's authority as
head of the household and the instability that would result from giving wives a measure of
independence. Proponents often drew on the literature celebrating women's virtues to
argue that wives should be afforded a measure of protection from their intemperate or
improvident husbands. "Radicals" advocated equality for women in terms that could be
taken directly from twentieth-century debates. See N. BASCH, supra note 42, 115-16, 121-
23, 135, 136-48, 162-83 (chronicling the use of literature by feminists to support property
law reform); K. LAZAROU, supra note 71, at 35; E. WARBASSE, supra note 45, at 307.
72. See N. BASCH, supra note 42, at 164; 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
§ 173 (1935); E. WARBASSE, supra note 45, at 305-07 passim; Chused, supra note 49, at
1359, 1361; Johnston, Sex and Property, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1066 (1972).
73. Under the English common-law provisions for dower, widows received a life
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went the commercial for the domestic thus received a greater
measure of financial protection. 74
With the growing maternal involvement in childrearing,
custody presumptions also changed. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, courts favored fathers over mothers in cus-
tody disputes in the belief that fathers were in a better position
to provide for their children. As the new ideology celebrated
the traits that only mothers could bring to the young, the pater-
nal presumption changed in favor of a maternal one.76 The
courts protected, and thereby encouraged, the increasing mater-
nal investment in childrearing.77
Finally, and with somewhat less fanfare, the states liberal-
ized the rules governing divorce. Between the turn of the cen-
tury and the end of the Civil War, virtually all of the states
passed legislation replacing cumbersome and expensive legisla-
tive divorce with more readily administered judicial divorces. 8
estate in one-third of the real property owned by their husbands during the marriage.
Widowers, by right of curtesy, received a life estate in all of their wives' property. H.
CLARK, supra note 47, at 288. Many states, at the time they enacted Married Women's
Property Acts, abolished dower, replacing it with provisions that allowed either spouse to
claim a forced share, in fee simple, of the other's estate. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71,
at 375-76; M. SALMON, supra note 44, at 141-84; Chused, supra note 49, at 1406.
74. The symbolic changes were greater than the financial effects. Allowing women
control of their separate property and a dower or elective share in fee simple followed the
decline in the importance of land holdings. Independent control of land would have given
a farmer's wife financial independence. In the industrial age, employment was a far more
important source of earnings, and the reforms did little to increase middle-class women's
workforce participation.
75. See M. GROSSBERG, supra note 51, at 234-42; Grossberg, Who Gets the Child?
Custody, Guardianship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth Century
America, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 235, 238-39 (1983); Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1154.
76. See Zainaldin, supra note 53, at 1070-73; see also M. GROSSBERG, supra note 51,
at 238-42, 244-53; Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1154-55.
77. Again, the major effect of the changes is likely to have been symbolic. The legal
changes followed the changes in childrearing patterns described above. As Teitelbaum
explains,
Modification or elimination of the common law doctrine regarding custody to
some extent reflects both the enhanced position of women and the perception of
separate spheres. The special moral and cultural qualifications of mothers were
relied on to explain custodial preferences in their favor, and it was concomitantly
assumed that fathers would rely on servants or female relatives to care for
children, their own time and energy being occupied by activities in the public
arena.
Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1155. While the changes in custody presumptions rewarded
mothers' investment in childrearing, they also came at a time when children changed from
economic assets to liabilities. See generally K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR (1989); S.
PRESSER & J. ZAiNALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY (2d ed. 1989).
78. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 182-83; 3 G. HowARD, A HISTORY OF
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Although divorce remained rare through the end of the century,
it became relatively more accessible79 and the fault standards
were interpreted more favorably for women than they had been
earlier in the century.20
At a time when women were playing a more specialized and
more important domestic role, these legal reforms made mar-
riage, particularly traditional marriage, more attractive. The
Married Women's Property Acts embraced the symbolism of
complementarity, giving some legal autonomy to married
women as well as some additional protection to the relatively
few upper and middle-class women bringing substantial property
of their own into marriage. The changing custody presumption
acknowledged women's contributions to their children's
upbringing. Divorce reforms gave men married to traditional
women an additional incentive to keep their end of the marital
bargain,"I while opening the door to escape from unhappy mar-
riages.8 2 The new legal order reinforced the new ideology. Both
encouraged middle-class women to respond to the removal of
MATRIMONIAL INsrrTONS 31-50, 96-101 (1904); Fineman, supra note 12, at 799. For a
history of divorce, see generally N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO (1962).
79. On the numbers of divorces, see Davis, Statistical Perspective on Marriage and
Divorce, 272 ANNULS 9, 18 (1950); Friedman, Rights of Passage Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 ORE. L. REV. 649, 651-54 (1984).
80. See Cott, supra note 35, at 592-605. Nancy Cott uses Massachusetts divorce
records to document the impact of changing models of marriage on divorce standards. See
also R. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890, at 78 (1982); M.
SALMON, supra note 45, at 62-66; Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1162-63. C. DEGLAR, AT
ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
PRESENT 168 (1980) argues that the growing divorce rate reflected "woman's drive for
greater autonomy within marriage and the family." Cf W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 6-7 (1967) ("[The need for divorce arises when] families become the
center of social organization.... [At this point,] their intimacy can become suffocating,
their demands unbearable, and their expectations too high to be easily realizable....
Divorce then becomes the safety valve that makes the system workable.").
Nancy Cott observes that as women's household roles became more specialized, the
"marriage choice determined women's life experience to a greater extent than it had
earlier." N. COTT, supra note 55, at 83 & n.33. She notes, however, that the "marriage
trauma" response applies to the early part of the nineteenth century. By the end of the
century, more women declined to marry than at any other point in American history.
"Toward the later part of the century, more women actually declined to marry; its last
decades witnessed the highest proportion of women never-marrying in all of American
history. Toward the turn of the twentieth century, when the frequency of divorce rose, the
proportion of women marrying returned to more typical levels." Id. at 83 n.33 (footnotes
omitted). Marriage rates returned to more normal levels only when divorce rates rose at
the turn of the century. Id.
81. Divorce law, of course, had long confined woman to traditional marital roles. On
the role of divorce in enforcing status roles, see Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1163.
82. See N. CoTr, supra note 55, at 83.
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commercially productive activities from the home by expanding
the domestic role of wife and mother, thereby easing the entry of
their husbands and sons into the workforce.8 3
By the later part of the twentieth century, the nineteenth-
century solution to the problems of early industrialization stood
in the way of continued economic evolution. While nineteenth-
century industrialism required more educated workers than did
an agrarian society, the greatest demand was for the unskilled
and semiskilled. The ideal of complementarity had encouraged
middle-class men to make the investment in education and train-
ing necessary to fill the relatively few but important managerial
positions in early capitalism, while persuading married middle-
class women to stay out of the labor market. On the other hand,
in the "postindustrial" economy that characterized post-war
America, 4 management-intensive light industry and service sec-
tor employment replaced heavy manufacturing and agriculture,
increasing the demand for educated, literate, English-speaking
workers.8 5 With middle-class men already fully employed, mid-
dle-class women provided the most readily available supply of
new labor.86  At the same time, the traditional demands on
83. As Mary Ryan observed, in her richly detailed study of the family in Oneida
County, New York:
much of [the] private labor, intelligence, and energy that reproduced and re-
created the middle class at midcentury was expended by women, especially the
mothers who cared for infants, socialized children, bestowed moral influence
upon breadwinners, took in boarders, and even entered the labor force in their
own right-all helping to maintain or advance the status of men in their families.
M. RYAN, supra note 61, at 185.
84. World War II and its aftermath masked some of the underlying economic
changes. Immediately following the War, returning veterans flooded the labor market.
The fifties' reaffirmation of married women's domestic role kept women occupied at home
until after the economy absorbed the men. One result of that reaffirmation of the domestic
role was the baby boom. J. KREPS, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT
WORK 5 (1971); V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 31 (1988); P.
ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYEMNT AND GENDER 12-13 (1986).
85. M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 305-06. England and Farkas describe the overall
changes in the economy in terms of increases in jobs already labelled female, primarily
service sector occupations. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at 148-49. If,
however, we examine the changes in rates of participation by women in selected job
categories, the biggest increases in female participation occur among professionals, officers
and managers, and sales. See Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later, Where Do We Stand on
Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1181-82
(1989). Accordingly, even if the overall increase in the demand for women workers reflects
an expansion in traditionally female jobs, the increase in demand for middle-class women
may be more broad based.
86. The other possibilities were lower class men, immigrant men and children. The
civil rights movement of the sixties, which gained force shortly before the women's
movement of the seventies, removed some of the barriers keeping blacks and other
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women as wives and mothers were decreasing. With the decline
in infant mortality, women had fewer children, and care of the
home had long since ceased to require fresh baked bread, hand
sewn clothing, and daily trips to the market.8 7 The "problem
that has no name" that Betty Friedan described in The Feminine
Mystique, the book that galvanized the women's movement in
the early sixties, was the failure of the roles of wife and mother
to continue to provide a satisfying lifetime occupation. s With
the increasing demand for women's services in the labor force
and the decreasing need for women to devote themselves to a
lifetime of domestic tasks, a reassignment of responsibilities was
in order. Just as nineteenth-century men went from the rela-
tively undifferentiated role of farmer and husband to a highly
specialized division of labor, so would twentieth-century women
experience an increasingly specialized division of labor.
The first impact that the modem women's movement had
on gender roles was to supply an ideology facilitating the large-
scale entry of married middle-class women into the labor mar-
ket.89 "Liberal" feminists9° did so by emphasizing sameness.
minorities out of skilled positions. The number of minorities added to the labor force,
particularly the number of well-educated minorities, however, remained small in
comparison to the demand. Immigration policies during the sixties and seventies favored
better educated, more skilled immigrants, but the total numbers were limited by a variety of
factors. See generally Kutscher, Overview and Implications of the Projections to 2000,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1987, at 4; P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at 125-
45; V. FucHs, supra note 84, at 22-31.
87. The need for an expanded domestic role had begun to disappear by the early
decades of this century, but first the Depression and then the post-War flood of veterans
suppressed any increase in demand for women workers. Similarly, while birth rates
declined steadily from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the "baby boom" involved a
temporary increase in fertitily rates. See generally P. PALMER, DoMEsTICIrY AND DIRT:
HousEwIvEs AND DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1945 (1989).
88. B. FRiEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 11-27 (1963).
89. Chafe observes:
the feminism of the 1960's and 1970's differed from previous women's movements
precisely because it grew out of and built upon prevailing social trends. For the
first time ideological protest and underlying social and economic changes
appeared to be moving in a similar direction.... [Flemale work patterns were
virtually transformed in the years after 1940. Prior to World War II, female
employment was limited primarily to young, single women or poor, married
women. Few middle-class wives held jobs. By 1975, in contrast, the two-income
family had become the norm; 49 per cent of all wives worked.... Although the
employment changes did not signify progress toward equality, they ensured that
social norms about woman's "place" no longer had a basis in reality.
W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 119-20.
90. We are using the term here as Robin West did. West, The Jurisprudence of
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22 (1988). According to Joan Williams, they are now
derisively referred to as "assimilationists." Williams, supra note 57, at 798.
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Drawing on the ideal of equality generated by the civil rights
movement, mid-century feminists denied the existence of any
significant differences between men and women. 91 Observable
differences were attributed to nurture, not nature.92 The new
ideal of equality replaced the older ideal of complementarity,
tearing down the distinctions between commercial and domestic,
between male and female spheres of influence. Separate was now
viewed as inherently unequal.93 "Liberated" women, freed from
an ideology that defined them exclusively in terms of their
domestic roles, were encouraged to become lawyers, electricians,
and accountants.94 At the same time, the traditional domestic
role, and those who continued to pursue it, were devalued.9"
Divorce reform has both contributed to this transformation,
and been shaped by it. As Herma Hill Kay recently reminded
us, the movement to eliminate fault as a prerequisite for divorce
preceded the modem women's movement.96  Fault, typically
defined in terms of adultery, desertion, or extreme cruelty,
became untenable as the exclusive grounds justifying divorce
91. See, e.g., W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 133; Cole, Strategies of Difference,
Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 J.L. & INEQUALnrY 33, 53-92 (1984);
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, land Preferential Treatment, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 606
(1977).
92. N. CHODOROW, REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 7 (1986); V. FucHs, supra note
84, at 140.
93. For a discussion of the relationship between the civil rights movement and the
women's movement, see sources cited supra note 91.
94. W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 140. Working-class women were less likely than
middle-class women to have the option of remaining out of the labor market before the
modem women's movement and enjoyed less of an expansion in employment opportunities
afterwards. See supra notes 70 & 85. For working-class women, increased opportunities
have taken the form not of traditionally male occupations (the increase in the number of
women plumbers, for example, has remained relatively small), but of lessened competition
from middle-class women for the positions women have traditionally filled. For example,
statistics demonstrate that between 1966 and 1987, the largest percentage increase in the
proportion of women employed was in the professional category, while the increases in
women craft workers and operators was relatively modest. All the areas in which women
workers were traditionally concentrated, however, such as office and clerical positions, also
experienced substantial increases in the percentage of women workers. See Rose, supra
note 85, at 1121 (reprinting EEOC report).
95. W. CRA, supra note 37, at 133. One of the reasons feminism has had its
primary influence on the middle class is that a central part of this message devalued choices
made by working-class women. Such women often worked in relatively low-status jobs
(such as factory or waitress positions) because they had to, and they aspired either to the
traditional "women's" jobs that middle-class women were now disdaining (such as
secretarial or nursing positions) or to the luxury of being able to forego their unsatisfying
jobs for the relatively higher status of full-time homemaker.
96. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 291,
299-304 (1987) [hereinafter Kay, An Appraisal]; see also Kay, supra note 11.
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when society no longer dictated that an unhappy couple stay
together in order to advance a larger set of societal interests. 7
By the time California enacted the first no-fault act in 1969,98
fault-based divorce had been obsolete for half a century.99 Most
divorces were uncontested and were granted on the basis of per-
functory testimony of marital fault.Y0° The principle that
divorce could proceed from the agreement of the parties was so
well established that the major argument advanced for divorce
reform was not an ideological one, but rather the practical need
to "free the administration of justice.., from the hypocrisy and
perjury that had resulted from the use of marital fault as a con-
trolling consideration in divorce proceedings." 101
The success of the no-fault movement nonetheless had a
major impact on women's participation in the labor market
because, in both symbolic and practical terms, it remade the
marital agreement. Until the mid-twentieth century, the marital
bargain exchanged the wife's services for her husband's sup-
port. 0 2 Once the exchange occurred, the wife's position became
significantly weaker than her husband's. 0 3  Her prospects for
remarriage declined with age. °4 Whatever employment oppor-
97. As we explained in our last article, fault-based divorce was a holdover from an
earlier period in which marriage was viewed as an indissoluable relationship. Since both
parties were bound to the marriage until death, proof of fault served to establish that one
party, in a manner unexcused by the actions of the other, had so flouted the marital
obligations that the relationship had for all intent and purposes already ended. The divorce
then released the innocent party from remaining obligations, permitting remarriage or a
formal division of property and other interests. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 883-84.
98. Kay, supra note 11, at I n.1. Kay further notes: "Several states had enacted 'no-
fault' grounds for divorce, such as incompatibility of temperament, voluntary separation
for a period of time, or incurable insanity, prior to the adoption of the California Family
Law Act.... [S]uch provisions served as 'an opening wedge' for the move to a 'pure' non-
fault approach based on factual breakdown of the marriage." Id. (citing M. RHEINSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 313-16). For a list of earlier statutes, see Kay, supra note 11, at 6-7 n.22.
99. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 475.
100. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 659-61; Kay, An Appraisal, supra note 96, at
298. In other words, divorce was proceeding from the agreement of the parties, not from
unilateral misconduct forcing the courts' hands.
101. Kay, An Appraisal, supra note 96, at 299; see also O'Connell, supra note 2, at
475-82.
102. H. CLARK, supra note 47, at 181; Lauerman, 4 Step Toward Enhancing
Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CINN. L.
REv. 493, 494 (1987).
103. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 260-67; Krauskopf, supra note 30, at
397; Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 437-53 (1986); Landes, supra note 10, at 42.
104. See generally Cohen, supra note 10; Mott & Moore, The Tempo of Remarriage
Among Young American Women, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 427; P. ENGLAND & G.
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tunities she had at the beginning of the marriage were limited by
years as a homemaker.0 5 Her husband, in contrast, retained the
career and other financial investments that had generated the
family income and, with his sources of income intact, enjoyed
favorable prospects for remarriage.'06 Because husbands and
wives' positions were not symmetrical, enforcement of the hus-
bands' lifelong promise of support was necessary to encourage
wives to make the career sacrifices that guaranteed their eco-
nomic dependence. 10 7 With expanding economic opportunies
for women, marriage, child-bearing, and the traditional domestic
role would become less attractive without reaffirmation of the
husband's marital promises. 08
The no-fault movement, however, rather than affirming the
traditional marital bargain, rendered it unenforceable. 0 9 The
elimination of fault as a prerequisite for divorce left open the
question of the financial allocations to be made upon divorce.
Fault, redefined in terms of breach of marital obligations, might
be irrelevant to the dissolution of the marriage but still be very
important in the financial settlement; just as breach of a com-
mercial contract, while insufficient to justify specific perform-
ance of a particular obligation, might still be a basis for
FARKAS, supra note 84, at 54-59; Becker, Landes & Michael, An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1151-77 (1977).
105. L. WrrzMAN, THE DvORCE REVOLUTION 204-11 (1985); Lauerman, supra
note 102, at 508-09.
106. Cohen, supra note 10, at 278; Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 260-62, 266. Divorce
law entitled women to a significant share of the family property only when employment
replaced real property as the major source of family income. See Brinig & Carbone, supra
note 5, at 863-64.
107. See G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 14-15; Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note
104, at 1152-53; Ellman, supra note 28, at 46-50; Landes, supra note 10, at 62-63; Peters,
supra note 103, at 443-44, 451-52. This does not mean, however, that the fault system was
designed and administered for the benefit of women. Marriage did not need to be that
attractive so long as women had relatively few alternatives to marriage and experienced
overwhelming societal pressure to define their roles in terms of marriage. The fault system
made women's domestic contributions worthwhile primarily by making divorce difficult
and by reinforcing the societal stigma of divorce.
108. Economists are virtually unanimous in predicting these results, and empirical
studies demonstrate drops in marriage and fertility rates, at least for the middle class. See
infra notes 130-31. Efforts to prove a causal relationship between legal changes and the
demographic data are questionable, however, because of the difficulty of holding nonlegal
variables constant. For efforts to establish statistical correlations, see Landes, supra note
10, at 36-49; Peters, supra note 103, at 445-52; Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 104;
see also W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 155-60; V. FUCHs, supra note 84, at 15-16, 23-27, 60-
73, 96-104; P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at 73-91.
109. Schneider, supra note 2, at 1809.
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damages." However, because the no-fault movement had
emphasized the difficulties of determining fault rather than its
irrelevance as a prerequisite for divorce, and because the courts
had trivialized the fault determination rather than acknowledge
its obsolescence, determinations of marital misconduct in any
form had acquired a bad name."' Many states, in enacting no-
fault legislation, followed California's lead, abolishing fault as
grounds for divorce and precluding any consideration of marital
misconduct in the financial allocations to be made. 112
The effect, probably unintended," 3 of precluding considera-
tion of fault was to change marriage from a lifetime commitment
whose obligations were enforced, albeit selectively, through a
form of specific performance," 14 to a contract terminable at
110. See Peters, supra note 103, at 442-43,448-49; Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at
884-87.
111. See, eg., N. BLAKE, supra note 78, at 152-72, 189-202; CALiFORNIA
GOVERNOR'S COCMM'N ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 1-2 (1966); Fineman, supra note 12, at
800; Kay, supra note 11, at 46; Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical
Analysis, 1 PAC. L.J. 156, 156-58 (1970); Note, Dissolution of Marriage in Iowa: Collateral
Determinations Under the No-Fault Concept, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 584, 597 (1973). See
generally L. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERsPEcFTrES
(1980).
112. Kay, supra note 11, at 11-12 & n.33; Kay, supra note 96, at 343; Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 5, at 887-88 n.132. Fineman notes that in Wisconsin the debate
focused on the removal of fault with little attention paid to the extensive economic reforms
proposed at the same time. Fineman, supra note 12, at 873-74.
113. Kay emphasizes that divorce reform preceded the modem women's movement,
and she notes that greater gender equality was not among the stated goals of the reformers,
at least in California. Kay, supra note 96, at 300. In other states, the abolition of fault as a
prerequisite for divorce occurred at the same time as property law reforms expressly
intended to achieve greater equality. See, eg., Fineman, supra note 12, at 853-67. In those
states, while the reformers did not necessarily address the full implications of a no-fault
system, they quite consciously insisted on a divorce system that treated women as equally
capable of labor-force participation. Id
114. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 884 (observing that the fault system identified
which marital obligations to discharge and which to reaffirm and that alimony constituted
continuation of the husband's duty of support, not a form of liquidated damages); cf
O'Connell, supra note 2, at 465-71 (describing alimony as part of a system of tort damages).
Singer argues that alimony awards were even less common during the fault era than now,
and that the fault system never lived up to its promise of lifetime support. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1103, 1105-09 (1989). However limited
support awards may have been historically, the fault system's primary role in reinforcing
the lifetime nature of the marital commitment was to make divorce difficult and to
reinforce the societal stigma against divorce. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 870-82.
Alimony awards, indeed divorce awards generally, were financially significant only for the
small percentage of divorcing couples with substantial assets, but the disproportionate
attention given to those cases served to reinforce, at a symbolic level, the importance of
marital responsibilities. On the fault system's effect on bargaining, see M. GLENDoN, supra
note 1, at 52; Fineman, supra note 12, at 802; Peters, supra note 103, at 448-49; see also
Fineman, supra note 12, at 790-92 (discussing the role of symbolism in law reform).
1991] RETHINKING MARRIGE 979
will." 5 Either party could end the marriage; the other had no
ability to prevent termination.1 1 6 Most of the states to address
the matter have ruled that the reasons why the marriage ended
are irrelevant. 1 7  The husband's promise of life-long support
became meaningless; the new standard emphasized the parties'
self-sufficiency.118 Upon divorce, the property was divided, and
dependent spouses were given transitional awards intended to
encourage their financial independence. 19 Protection of the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, though discussed
in the case law, disappeared from practice.120 The result, as
Lenore Weitzman documents, was a divorce system that left
men financially better off and women worse off than they had
been when they were married.12 1
115. Indeed, employing traditional contract analysis, the contract is not only
terminable at will, but "illusory." For under modem contract law, breach of a contract
terminable at will is compensable while breach of marital obligations is not. See, eg.,
Lauren v. Marc & Melfa, Inc. 446 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1984); Jones v. East Center for
Community Mental Health, Inc. v. Nat'l Labs, Inc., 153 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1963); Chadd v. Midwest Franchise Corp., 22 Neb. 502, 412 N.W.2d 453 (1987); see also
M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 52-57, 159-70.
116. While state law varies in theory, Homer Clark describes the effect of the
changes: "In practice this has come to mean that either spouse can obtain a divorce at will.
It is therefore accurate to say that today the concept of permanence has been eliminated
from the legal definition of marriage." Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WIjAmETrE L.
REv. 441, 444 (1976); see M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 4; L. WErrZMAN, supra note 105,
at 26-28. This change, of course, affects the parties' relative bargaining positions in divorce.
See Kay, supra note 11, at 62-63.
117. See sources cited supra note 112.
118. Under traditional family law principles, of course, the duty of support was the
husband's alone. Lauerman, supra note 102, at 494; Singer, supra note 114, at 1112. See
generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 105, at 41-46; Fineman, supra note 12, at 829, 835;
Williams, supra note 57, at 824.
119. See L. WErrzmAN, supra note 105, at 164; Kay, supra note 11, at 49-51;
Rutherford, supra note 29, at 563-64; Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce" Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L.
REv. 1181, 1221-31 (1981).
120. For an example of its use in the case law, see Kitson v. Kitson, 17 Or. App. 648,
655-57, 523 P.2d 575, 579 (1974). For studies of the financial impact of divorce on women,
see generally T. ARENDELL, MoTHmS AND DIVORCE (1986); Bell, Alimony and the
Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q 225 (1988);
Day & Bahr, Income Changes Following Divorce and Remarriage, J. DIVORCE, Spring
1986; Rowe & Morrow, The Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or
More Years of Marriage, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 463 (1988); Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce, supra note 119; Wishik, Economics of Divorce, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986).
Moreover, other studies indicate that precluding consideration of marital misconduct has
had an impact on the spouses' respective bargaining power in reaching divorce settlements.
See Peters, No-Fault Divorce and Bargaining over the Divorce Settlement, in ALIMONY 18,
30 (Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Fam. L. 1988).
121. See L. WErSZMAN, supra note 105, at 337-56 (concluding that women
experience a 73% decline in their standard of living in the year after divorce while men
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This divorce system complemented the message of liberal
feminism.'22 The nineteenth-century ideal of complementarity
defined the wife's role in terms of domesticity. Marriage law
protected her from the resulting financial dependence by making
divorce difficult and by promising financial security to wives
who upheld their end of the bargain. 23 With dramatically rising
divorce rates, modem women had no certainty that their mar-
riages would last nor even the promise of financial protection in
the event they did not.124 Young women in the mid-eighties,
whether consciously "feminist" or not, agreed that they could no
longer rely on marriage for their economic security. 125  Young
couples quickly began to view both spouses' incomes as essential
to their economic well-being. 2 6  The courts reinforced these
conclusions by demanding that divorcing women, whatever their
experience a concomitant 42% increase). Weitzman's methodology has been criticized.
See Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution Revisited" Revisited, 9 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 251
(1989); Hoffman & Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Jacobs, Faulting No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 767;
Kay, supra note 11, at 59-77; Singer, supra note 114, at 1103-12. Weitzman almost
certainly overstates the case that men are better off after marriage, in that she considers the
wives' loss of their husbands' income without considering the husbands' loss of their wives'
services, but, as Joan Krauskopf observes, "Even those who criticize Weitzman's figures
differ on amount, not on significant disparity in standard of living between ex-husbands and
ex-wives." J. KRAusKos'F, supra note 1-3, at 271 n.65.
122. See Fineman, supra note 12, at 821-25.
123. See Singer, supra note 114, at 1112 ("Historically, alimony statutes were part
and parcel of a larger family law regime that stripped women of legal and economic
independence by 'removing them from the world of work and property and
"compensating" them by making their designated place secure.' ") (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279 n.9 (1979)). Joan Williams observes: "By the nineteenth century, men's and
women's roles were sharply differentiated. Under the new gender system, married women
ordinarily experienced utter financial dependence on their husbands, though a divorceless
society protected wives from destitution so long as they stayed with their husbands and-
perhaps more to the point-their husbands stayed with them." Williams, supra note 57, at
823-24.
124. The greatest impact no-fault divorce has had is not on the extent of the financial
protection afforded but on the frequency of divorce. Between 1970 and 1980, the divorce
rate more than doubled and researchers with the United States Census Bureau estimate
that 49% of all married men and women will divorce. "The continuing high divorce rate
may well be the most dramatic change in family life in twentieth-century America." T.
ARENDELL, supra note 120, at 1; see also Williams, supra note 57, at 824 ("In 1870, 8
percent of [American] marriages ended in divorce; today 48 percent of all marriages do,
and half of all American children will experience family disruption by age eighteen.").
125. See Homblower, Born in the Sixties: A Confident Generation, Wash. Post, May
27, 1986, at A9; L. Baker & R. Emery, When Homo Economicus Marries: An Empirical
Study 19, 53, 63 (unpublished manuscript)(available from Baker & Emery at the University
of Virginia).
126. See, e.g., M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 305, 323; Richman, The Middle Class:
How It Lives, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 104; Rubin & Riney, Expenditure Pattern
Differentials Between One-Earner and Dual-Earner Households: 1972-73, 1984, 17 J.
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earlier expectations, however young their children, and however
long their marriage, had to develop their own sources of
income.127 By the beginning of the eighties, the separation of the
commercial from the domestic and the definition of a wife's role
exclusively in terms of domesticity were gone. Feminist theory
led-and divorce reform pushed--even the married mothers of
young children into the labor market.128
This redefinition of roles, however, did not end with
middle-class women joining their husbands in the single-minded
pursuit of law firm partnerships. 2 9 There was still the small
matter of who was to take care of the children. The initial
response appeared to be no one. As record numbers of women
entered the labor force, middle-class women deferred marriage
and child-bearing. 130  American fertility rates reached a record
low in 1976.131 Childrearing might no longer be a lifelong occu-
CONSUMER REs. 43 (1990); Sherman, How High School Kids See the 1990s, TiME, Mar.
26, 1990, at 221.
127. See T. ARENDELL, supra note 120, at 33-34; L. WErrzMAN, supra note 105, at
33, 186-87, 330-33; Kay, supra note 11, at 43; Rowe & Morrow, supra note 120, at 482-83.
See generally Note, Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 667 (1984-1985).
Martha Fineman notes that liberal reformers may have been concerned that any
recognition that women should be treated differently from men in the family area because
of their gender-related social characteristics might be transferred with very different
symbolic connotations into the market. Such differential treatment in the family sphere
may be used to perpetuate discriminatory beliefs already operating to disadvantage women
at work. Fineman, supra note 12, at 825.
128. M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 305; P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at
14-15; Williams, supra note 57, at 832. England and Farkas explain the rise in workforce
participation by the married mothers of young children in terms of an increase in demand
for workers filling traditionally female jobs, increasing the wages for these positions and the
opportunity cost of remaining home. Id. at 150. They concede, however, that other, less
easily measurable factors such as "changing sex-role socialization, later age at marriage,
lowered fertility, high divorce rates, and rising monthly payments for houses ... may have
also contributed to the trend." Id.
129. Nor did it result in substantial equality for women in the marketplace. See, eg.,
O'Neill, The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 91,
91 (1985) (concluding that the wage gap between men and women did not narrow between
1955 and 1982); see also Williams, supra note 57, at 825-26; sources cited supra notes 116-
119.
130. See V. FucHs, supra note 83, at 63-64; Bloom, What's Happening to the Age at
First Births in the United States? A Study of Recent Cohorts, 19 DEMOGRAPHY 351, 359-66
(1982).
131. See Longman, Justice Between Generations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1985,
at 73, 79; see also W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 120-21. Fertility rates are even lower for
the middle class, as middle-class women were the most likely to defer marriage and child-
bearing, and to have fewer children in order to pursue careers. Chafe observes:
Although many forces contributed to the continuing decline [in birth rates],
the interaction of female employment with changing attitudes toward women's
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pation, but it still interfered with medical residencies, mortgage
payments, and geographic mobility.13 2 The new ideology pro-
vided no model for combining parenthood and profession. As
Joan Williams recently observed, "[w]estem wage labor is pre-
mised on an ideal worker with no child care responsibilities. 133
The new feminism, or at least what Robin West calls "cul-
tural feminism,"1 34 tried to provide an answer. In 1982, Carol
Gilligan published In A Different Voice. The book, a critique of
empirical studies purporting to demonstrate that boys' moral
development occurred earlier than girls', interpreted the differ-
ences in terms of differences between boys and girls' experience
of the world. Gilligan concluded:
[T]he standard of moral judgment that informs their [women's]
assessment of self is a standard of relationship, an ethic of nur-
turance, responsibility, and care .... [M]orality is seen by
these women as arising from the experience of connection and
conceived as a problem of inclusion rather than one of balanc-
ing claims. 135
For men on the other hand, "the moral imperative appears
rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to
roles appears to have been decisive. Throughout the 1960's, women married
later, delayed the birth of their first child, and bore their last child at an earlier
age. Whether as cause or effect, this trend coincided with many women finding
occupations and interests away from the home.
W. CHAFE, supra note 37, at 121.
132. For working-class women, the expense of child care dramatically reduced the
attractiveness of full-time employment, persuading many mothers to switch to part-time
employment timed to take advantage of the availability of family babysitters. See M.
RYAN, supra note 37, at 323.
133. Williams, supra note 57, at 822 (footnote omitted). The conflicts between work
and family have been exacerbated in many middle-class professions by the presence of large
numbers of women. The increase in the number of women lawyers, for example, has
increased the competition for legal jobs. That increased competition often takes the form of
a greater emphasis on billable hours or, for law professors, publications. Accordingly, jobs
that twenty years ago might have been structured in a way to make them compatible with
childrearing may now, as a direct result of the increased competition occurring because of
the presence of women in the workforce, be far more difficult to combine with active
parenthood. The advantage enjoyed by workers without family responsibilities has
therefore increased. See generally Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women
and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 251, 289
(1989); Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 19,
103 & n.82, 126 & n.158 (1989); Margolick, Wooed, Wined and Overworked Wall St
Lawyers Meet Pink Slips, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 5; Schwartz, Management,
Women and the New Facts of Life, 89 HARv. Bus. REv. 65 (1988).
134. West, supra note 90, at 17-20.
135. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 156-60 (1982).
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protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfill-
ment." 136  Gilligan's celebration of difference, her claim that
women contribute to a higher morality that cannot be measured
by a model created by and for men, has been enormously influ-
ential, affecting feminist work in all areas of study.137
Unsurprisingly, Gilligan tied her discussion of "difference"
to the fact that women rear children and men do not.1 38  The
"feminine" traits she celebrated are those connected with moth-
erhood: nuturance, responsibility, and care. The literature Gilli-
gan inspired 139 calls for the use of feminist insights to transform
virtually all areas of life and thought. It also suggests a re-evalu-
ation of the domestic roles that liberal feminism encouraged
women to devalue, if not abandon. 40 Taken to its logical con-
136. Id at 100.
137. Gilligan was not alone in celebrating women's separate voice. See generally N.
CHODOROW, supra note 92; Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and
Ritual" Relations Between Women in Nineteenth Century America, in A HERITAGE OF
HER OwN, supra note 69, at 311. Betty Friedan has also joined the change in emphasis.
See B. FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE 38-41, 83-87 (1981).
138. The feminism of "difference" involves a vigorous debate over the source of this
difference. The earlier feminists minimizied the importance of innate differences,
attributing observed differences to nurture rather than nature. The major contribution of
Robin West's influential piece, The Jurisprudence of Gender, is her attempt to define
"feminist insights into women's true nature" in terms of biological differences that
determine the different ways men and women experience life. West, supra note 90, passim.
Joan Williams disagrees with the conclusion that biology is as deterministic as West
suggests. Williams, supra note 57, at 800-01 n.11; see also E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND
THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 26 (1980); Rossi, Gender and Parenthood, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 1, 9
(1984); Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, DAEDALUS, Spring 1977, at 1, 4-5.
139. Williams, supra note 57, at 803 n.17. Robin West describes the implications of
Gilligan's conclusions this way:
Cultural feminism does not simply identify women's differences-patriarchy too
insists on women's differences-it celebrates them. Women's art, women's craft,
women's narrative capacity, women's critical eye, women's ways of knowing, and
women's heart, are all, for the cultural feminist, redefined as things to celebrate.
Quilting, cultural feminism insists, is not just something women do; it is art, and
should be recognized as such. Integrative knowledge is not a confused and failed
attempt to come to grips with the elementary rules of deductive logic; it is a way
of knowledge and should be recognized as such. . . . Women's distinctive
aesthetic sense is as valid as men's. Most vital, however, for cultural feminism is
the claim that intimacy is not just something women do, it is something human
beings ought to do. Intimacy is a source of value, not a private hobby. It is
morality, not habit.
West, supra note 90, at 18.
140. M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 321 ("[A]lthough the birthrate and marriage rate
have fallen precipitously, very few women have forsworn matrimony and chilbearing
entirely. Less than 10 percent of all women in their early thirties were single, and only 13
percent of those married were childless.") (citations omitted).
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clusion, the feminism of difference can be said to imply that
women are more nurturing because they rear children; that
because women are more nurturing, they value family and chil-
dren more than their spouses do; because of those values, they
are more likely to place the welfare of the family above their
individual advancement; and that their subsequent choices to
stay home with sick children, to choose more flexible jobs, and
to interrupt their careers ought to be respected and protected.
While these conclusions may be controversial, 141 Robin
West has described Gilligan's book and the type of thinking it
represents as "feminism's official story."'142 We believe Gilli-
gan's work has been so phenomenally influential because, once
married middle-class women permanently entered the labor
force, making the earlier ideology of domesticity obselete, no
model existed to reconcile the demands of home and the
demands of the market. Women were working more, and mid-
dle-class women believed that they should be thinking in terms
of careers as well as jobs. Yet, the first generation of middle-class
women for whom full labor force participation was a possibility
were having children and, as Joan Williams has observed, mak-
ing choices that placed them at odds with the liberal feminist
ideal of equality on male terms. 143 The new feminism frees
women from the need to succeed exclusively on those terms. It
offers the hope of transforming the workplace to accommodate
women's values as well as men's, 44 and it justifies the choice of
141. For a critique of Gilligan's work in these terms, see Williams, supra note 57,
who argues that Gilligan may encourage "women to choose economic marginalization and
celebrate the choice as a badge of virtue." Id at 819. MacKinnon argues that by
"establishing that women reason differently from men on moral questions, she [Gilligan]
revalues that which has accurately distinguished women from men by making it seem as
though women's moral reasoning is somehow women's, rather than what male supremacy
has attributed to women for its own use." C. MAcKINNON, supra note 42, at 51; cf West,
supra note 90, at 29 (describing "radical" feminists as those who, rather than celebrate
women's connections to others, identify them as a source of oppression).
142. West, supra note 90, at 15.
143. See Williams, supra note 57, at 798-99.
144. The modem feminist agenda has focused primarily on the transformation of the
workplace, on the need to eliminate discrimination in hiring, to insure adequate provision
for childcare, to accommodate the childrearing without marginalizing the caregivers, and
to move away from gender-stereotyped definitions of performance. See, eg., Williams,
supra note 57, at 833-36. See generally Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor
Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55 (1979); Hartmann, Achieving
Economic Equity for Women, in WINNING AMERICA: IDEAS AND LEADERSHIP FOR THE
1990s, at 99 (M. Raskin & C. Hartman eds. 1988); Taub, From Parental Leaves to
Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381 (1984-1985). Williams adds,
however, that "[s]uch a goal today seems utopian ...." Williams, supra note 57, at 836.
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work and family, career and children, 145 and the accommoda-
tions needed to permit both.'"
The rediscovery of motherhood as a defining component of
women's lives and of the economic consequences of mothers'
primary responsibility for the care of their children has led to a
re-examination of the financial implications of no-fault divorce.
In particular, Lenore Weitzman's empirical work has focused
attention on the differential impact divorce has on men and
women, and the disastrous consequences for the mothers of
young children. 147 The primary result has been a reconsidera-
tion of the bases for spousal support. 148 The older justifications,
The primary hope for such a transformation may be the predicted labor shortage of skilled
workers that may persuade employers to offer additional family benefits as a way of
recruiting women employees. See, eg., Collins, Wooing Workers in the 90's7 New Role for
Family Benefits, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
145. While many mothers of young children still choose to devote full-time care to
their children, dramatically fewer women view the domestic role as a lifetime occupation.
For a discussion of sequencing, see generally A. CARDOzo, SEQUENCING (1986); Rimer,
Sequencers: Putting Careers on Hold, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1988, at A21, col.
146. With or without a transformation in the workplace, women, while continuing to
work outside the home in large numbers, are making choices that Joan Williams concludes
lead to their economic marginalization. Williams, supra note 57, at 799 & n.7, 831 &
n.146, 833. Williams warns that, in the nineteenth century, "women's rich emotional
relationships in their disempowered sphere and the seductive compliments of domesticity-
in particular, the notion that women were more moral than men-encouraged women to
'choose' their own repression." Id. at 830. She warns that modem feminist literature such
as Gilligan's may similarly encourage women to subordinate their careers to childrearing.
Id.
147. L. WnrrzmAN, supra note 105, at 143-83, 262-72, 337-56.
148. While much of the recent discussion has focused on spousal support, property
settlements and support have always been linked. Before the wave of divorce reform that
accompanied no-fault, divorce awards mirrored the provisions made for widows. The
community-property states, influenced by Spanish and French tradition, divided the
community property equally as they would have upon the death of one of the spouses and,
at least during the nineteenth century, permanent alimony awards were virtually
nonexistent. In the common-law states, the awards mirrored dower provisions that granted
widows a one-third life estate in their husbands' property. Courts recognizing divorce a
mensa et thoro allowed the husbands to retain all of the family property, including their
wives' separate estates, while the wives received alimony, often calculated in terms of one-
third of their husband's income. See generally Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill 207 (1843). Even after
the states allowed divorce a vinculo, the awards continued to follow the earlier practice,
with the husband retaining the bulk of the family estate while the wife received alimony.
See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 6 Ind. 100 (1854) (overturning an award of property to the wife in
fee simple and granting alimony instead). After passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts, many states permitted property awards to the wife, particularly where the wife had
brought the property into the marriage in the first place. But, well into the twentieth
century the common-law states continued to award the bulk of the property acquired
during the marriage to the husband, with alimony used to compensate the wife. See
generally M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 52-53; Fineman, supra note 12, at 806-08.
Divorce reformers during the no-fault era emphasized a clean break rather than the
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which tied alimony to the husband's duty of support or to the
divorce court's finding of fault, were gone.149 The new emphasis
on transitional support designed to encourage financial indepen-
dence failed to make adequate provision for women's contribu-
tions to childrearing. 150  The emerging model, which we have
elsewhere described as restitution based, justifies spousal support
as compensation for the career sacrifices mothers make in the
interests of their children or their husband's career. 51
The new divorce rules together with the new feminist ideal
encourage women to choose both to stay within the labor force
and to value childrearing above career pursuits. The new femi-
nist ideal ridicules the very idea of separate spheres without
eliminating differences in the assignment of responsibilities.1 2
Men and women are to perform the same jobs (postal worker,
parent), but they need not perform them in the same way. In a
parallel fashion, the new divorce rules153 discourage the tradi-
tional exchange of support for domestic services, while reaffirm-
continuing obligations of the marriage and use of the property division rather than
maintenance as the primary vehicle for divorce settlements. See Kay, supra note 11, at 47.
The problem is that for most divorcing couples, the most important asset is the husband's
earning power. L. WErrZMAN, supra note 105, at 388.
149. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 492.
150. L. WEirZMAN, supra note 104, at 365-66; Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade
of Development, 50 Mo. L. REv. 259, 281, 295 (1985); O'Connell, supra note 2, at 507-08.
151. The courts have been ahead of the scholars in embracing this type of thinking.
See, eg., Grove v. Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571 P.2d 477, 484-85 (1977); Lash v. Lash,
307 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Joan Krauskopf has been among the leaders urging consideration of "human capital"
in the economic decisions made upon divorce. See Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 411; see
also Krauskopf, supra note 149, at 293. See generally Beninger & Smith, Career
Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201 (1982);
O'Connell, supra note 2, at 498-506; O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After
Divorce, 61 N.D.L. REv. 225 (1985); Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-
Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1980). For a theory justifying
modem spousal support almost exclusively in terms of lost career opportunities or
contributions to the other spouse's career or degree, see Ellman, supra note 2, at 53-73.
152. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 507-08; Olsen, supra note 57. See generally
West, supra note 90 (on the distinctions between different forms of feminism).
153. Our description of the "new divorce rules" is as overstated as our definition of
the "new feminist ideal." Just as there is dissent from Carol Gilligan's celebration of
women's "different voice," so is there disagreement among the states as the remaining basis
for spousal support, with a number of states retaining consideration of marital misconduct
in some form. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 885 n.125, 886 n.129. The growing
trend, however, forbids consideration of fault in the financial allocations made upon
divorce. See Kay, supra note 11, at 72-74 n.363. In those states that preclude
consideration of fault, loss of career opportunities and contributions to the other spouse's
career are the most consistently articulated bases for spousal support. See, eg., Stiff v. Stiff,
395 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Jamison v. Churchill Truck Lines, 632
S.W.2d 34, 35-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Grove, 280 Or. at 351-52, 571 P.2d at 484-85. For a
RETHINKING MARRIAGE
ing the mother's primary responsibility for the care of the
children and sanctioning career sacrifices, but only if temporary
and if made on behalf of the children or the other spouse's
career.
154
Translating these developments into the language of legal
obligation, the marital contract is dead, not because it is indeter-
minate, but because society wishes to discourage rather than
protect economic reliance on marriage. Restitution, at least on a
selective basis, is alive and well because, while married middle-
class women are to join their husbands in supplying the labor
needs of the postindustrial economy, they are also to remain pri-
marily responsible for the care of their children. Unresolved is
the issue whether an as yet unrealized transformation of the
workplace together with a symbolic, but financially inadequate,
commitment to compensation for middle-class women's career
sacrifices can adequately provide for either the workforce or the
domestic needs of the future.
IV. Is DIVORCE REFORM A GOOD IDEA? THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND GENDER
In the first Part of this Article, we explored the role of civil
obligation as a framework for analyzing the societal choices
implicit in divorce. In the second Part, we explored the broad
currents underlying those choices, explaining in more detail the
role of divorce rules in facilitating a reallocation of responsibili-
ties between husbands and wives. In this last section, we
examine the possibilities for reform, analyzing the alternative
agendas in terms of the nature of marriage that the advocates
wish to encourage.
summary of the academic writing on this point, see O'Connell, supra note 2, at 500-06;
sources cited supra note 151.
154. Existing divorce rules do this by emphasizing transitional awards designed to
ease the dependent spouse's return to the workforce. See sources cited supra note 119.
Under support theories that depend on proof of lost career opportunities, the need to
establish the career potential sacrificed also will have this effect. See Carbone, supra note
13, at 1497; Ellman, supra note 2, at 78. Partnership proposals that define support
obligation in terms of the length of the marriage irrespective of either spouse's actual gain
or loss create an incentive to beat the system, that is, to suffer no more of a career loss than
that for which the system provides compensation. See Singer, supra note 114, at 1118.
For more traditional women who fail to develop their earning potential without
conferring a direct benefit on their mates, there may be no basis for support in theory at all.
For illustrations of this point, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 891; Ellman, supra
note 2, at 56-58, 74-77. In practice, support is likely to be dependent on need in an amount
unrelated to the extent of their actual loss. See Carbone, supra note 13, at 1497-98 (on the
importance of retaining need as a residual justification).
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In considering the different visions of the family, it is useful
to start with what we will call the "traditionalist" view, that is, a
defense of the relatively traditional pattern of gender responsibil-
ities that prevailed during the latter part of the nineteenth and
first half of the twentieth century.155 The traditionalists argue
that men and women should continue to perform different roles
within marriage, that these gender differences make women
more economically vulernable to divorce than men, and that,
when divorce is, common, women will continue to devote their
energies to childrearing and homemaking only if these contribu-
tions are protected.1 56  The traditionalists favor a contract
approach that protects the expectation interest of the non-
breaching party in order to encourage specialization within the
family and to deter breaches or "shirking" of marital obliga-
tions.1 57 They therefore *decry the elimination of fault from
divorce, and favor relatively generous financial settlements for
non-breaching wives. 58
Gary Becker, a University of Chicago economist who pio-
neered the application of economic analysis to the family, is the
traditionalists' leading proponent. He justifies a division of labor
between paid employment and domestic work on efficiency
grounds. He argues that the theory of comparative advantage
demonstrates that specialization will result in greater productiv-
ity; that, for biological reasons, women are better suited than
men for childrearing; and that women will sacrifice their own
earning capacity for household-specific investments, such as
childrearing, only if their financial sacrifices are protected by
155. In examining the traditionalist perspective, we have focused primarily on those
influenced by Gary Becker and the use of economic analysis because they have received the
greatest attention in the legal literature. There are certainly other traditionalist
perspectives, however. See, e-g., F. CANCmAN, LOVE IN AMERICA: GENDER AND SELF-
DEVELOPMENT 122-33 (1987); Gedlicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy and Values:
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modem America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1579 (1987);
Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 865 (1989); Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy---Balancing the Individual
and Social Interest, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); see also infra note 169.
156. See G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 16; see also Becker, Landes & Michael, supra
note 104, at 1143-45; Landes, supra note 10, at 35.
157. For an economic critique of Becker, see P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note
84, at 88-89.
158. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 10, at 35; see also Haas, The Rationality and
Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C.L. REV. 879 (1988). None of
these writers has fully explained what such a divorce system would look like or what
definition of breach of marital obligations would apply.
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enforceable long-term contracts. 159 On that basis, Becker's asso-
ciate, Elisabeth Landes, has argued for retention of fault as a
basis for divorce awards and for the use of alimony to compen-
sate for the opportunity costs women incur in entering into
traditional marriages.' 60
Lloyd Cohen has reached similar conclusions on somewhat
different grounds. Citing statistics demonstrating that divorced
women enjoy lesser opportunities for remarriage than divorced
men, Cohen argues that "women in general are of relatively
higher value as wives at younger ages and depreciate much more
rapidly than do men." 161 Cohen attributes the differences to dif-
ferent mortality rates, the presence of children, and the nature of
sexual attraction. 162 He observes that, because of these factors,
gains from the marriage are not distributed symmetrically.
Rather, he suggests that
men tend to obtain gains early in the relationship when their
own contributions to the marriage are relatively low and that of
their wives relatively great. Similarly, later on in the marriage
women tend as a general rule to obtain more from the contract
than do men. The creation of this long-term imbalance pro-
vides the opportunity for strategic behavior whereby one of the
parties, generally the man, might find it in his interest to breach
the contract unless otherwise constrained.1 63
Cohen concludes that the failure of the legal system to deal with
the problem contributes to fewer marriages, fewer middle-class
children, and fewer women specializing in homemaking-pro-
ducing "an inefficient allocation of resources."'  While Cohen
159. G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 14-37. Indeed, Becker concludes that "one can
even say that 'marriage' is defined by a long-term commitment between a man and a
woman." Id at 15.
160. Landes, in particular, argues that
an efficient alimony system would penalize the party more at fault in contributing
to a divorce. Such a penalty would reduce the incentive of both spouses to cheat
within marriage, since the gain from cheating would be reduced by the expected
alimony penalty should the marriage dissolve. Hence, penalizing the party more
at fault in contributing to a divorce economizes on the costs of enforcing the
terms of the marriage and increases the expected gain from investment in the
marriage.
Landes, supra note 10, at 48-49; see also Haas, supra note 158, at 889.
161. Cohen, supra note 10, at 278.
162. Id at 278-87.
163. I at 287.
164. Id at 295-98. Cohen acknowledges that a variety of societal trends have
contributed to these changes and that the legal system provides only one, and not
necessarily the most effective, of the restraints that have traditionally been used to police
marital contracts.
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declines to embrace any of the possible solutions he critiques, he
acknowledges that the most effective legal response would
require a determination of who breached the marriage contract
and of the resulting loss to the non-breaching party, in short, the
traditional elements of a contract approach. 165
Becker and Cohen thus present two different justifications
for a contract model of divorce. Becker uses the language of
economics to re-invent the separate spheres that were the hall-
mark of the nineteenth-century ideal of complementarity. He
describes gender roles in terms of a choice between either shared
responsibilities, or female specialization in the home combined
with male specialization in the market. His analysis dictates a
contract approach designed to protect expectation because of his
depiction of female specialization in terms of a lifetime commit-
ment to homemaking at the expense of career development.1 66
Frances Olsen has convincingly demonstrated that this dichot-
omy is a false one.1 67 The large scale entry of married mothers
into the labor force has been marked far more by increasing spe-
cialization among women than by any decreasing specialization
within the family. Women may devote more of their energies to
their careers than to homemaking, while still remaining primar-
ly responsible for the family's domestic affairs.1 68 Because
165. Cohen concludes that the "determination of breach is a substantial test but is
dwarfed by the difficulties of specifying and quantifying the loss in quasi rents occasioned
by a breach of the marriage agreement." Id at 303. The problems of quantification are
compounded by the fact that Cohen defines the value of marriage not just in terms of lost
support, but in terms of the loss of companionship as well. Id at 268-71.
166. Becker concludes not only that men and women should specialize between home
and market, but that "with constant or increasing returns to scale, all members of efficient
households must be completely specialized." G. BECKER, supra note 9, at 20 (emphasis in
original).
167. Olsen, supra note 57, at 1563-78.
168. Indeed, if the nineteenth-century shift from farm to factory can be described in
terms of increasing specialization among men, the twentieth-century movement of mothers
from home to office can be described in terms of increasing specialization among women.
Most studies show that as married women have increased their participation in the labor
force, they have hired other women to assist them. Their husbands assume only slightly
more responsibility for housework than they did when their wives stayed home. See V.
Fucss, supra note 84, at 78, 103; Dowd, supra note 133, at 85 & n.14; Stafford, Backman
& Dibona, The Division of Labor Among Cohabitating and Married Couples, 39 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 43 (1977); Vanek, Time Spent in Housework, 231 ScI. AM. 116, 118
(1974). -The large-scale entry of married women into the labor force can better be described
not in terms of less specialization within the family, but in terms of greater specialization
among women in the provision of domestic activities. Even lower fertility rates among
middle-class women, to the extent it means that the workers of tomorrow will be supplied
by working-class and immigrant women, can be cited as examples of greater specialization.
For a discussion of specialization, see Part III of this Article.
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Becker addresses only "the sharp sexual division of labor in all
societies between the market and household sectors," 16 9 he offers
no basis for the modem choice between contract-and protec-
tion of the standard of living made possible by the other spouse's
higher income-and restitution, which compensates only for
specific sacrifices made in the interests of the children. 170
Becker's conclusion that specialization within the family is "effi-
cient" begs the question of whether greater specialization among
women in the provision of domestic services is not "efficient" as
well. 171
Conversely, Cohen's analysis, at least at the point at which
it is farthest from Becker's, provides a justification for a contract
approach that is independent of the existence of economic ine-"
quality between husbands and wives. 172  In line with Cohen's
analysis, even if men and women enjoyed equal career opportu-
nities, and even if they shared child-care responsibilities equally,
women would still enjoy fewer opportunities for remarriage than
men because of differences in mortality and the nature of sexual
attraction. 173 Accordingly, even in an era of economic equality,
men would have greater incentives than women to breach their
marital obligations, and women would have less of an incentive
to enter into marriage if they could not enforce marital
169. G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 21.
170. For a discussion of restitution, see supra notes 31-32 and infra notes 199-201.
171. For a very different view of the economics underlying the modem division of
labor within the family, see P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at 191-94.
To carry the traditionalist approach to its logical extreme requires going beyond
Becker's conclusions. The strongest statement of a traditionalist approach would be that:
(1) divorce is harmful in itself because of the effect on children; (2) liberalized divorce laws
makes divorce more attractive for men while greater economic independence makes divorce
more attractive for women and both should be discouraged; (3) a contract approach would
facilitate both goals because it would reinforce traditional gender roles and deter breach of
marital obligations. For a discussion of the harmful effects of divorce on children, see
generally Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child
at Divorce, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1985); Scott, supra note 2. For the relationship between
increased economic independence for women and the divorce rate, see G. BECKER, supra
note 10, at 231; P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 84, at 64-65. The conclusion
depends, of course, on the benefits to children from intact, although often unhappy,
marriages outweighing the benefits from women's increasing economic independence. See
also sources cited supra note 155.
172. Cohen agrees with Becker that the failure to enforce marital contracts will
discourage investment in children and homemaking. Cohen, supra note 10, at 295-96.
However, Cohen does not examine the implications of these developments other than to
suggest that they are an "inefficient allocation of resources," and, like Becker, he does not
compare the benefits of women's greater workforce participation with the purported loss of
efficiency within the family. Id at 296.
173. Cohen, supra note 10, at 280-81, 284-87.
TULANE LAW REVIEW
commitments. 174
Separating Cohen's analysis from its economic underpin-
nings, however, raises other problems with use of the analysis as
a justification for a contract approach. First, England and Far-
kas suggest that "the nature of sexual attraction," which Cohen
describes as eternal and unchanging, may itself be a function of
the traditional division of gender roles. They predict that age
differences between spouses will decline over time. 175 Second, as
Cohen points out, calculating the value of marriage in terms of
companionship is problematic at best. 176 So long as marriage
was viewed as an economic relationship, the expectation interest
in marriage could be valued in terms of the standard of living
made possible by the other spouse's income, that is, in terms of
the traditional standard for spousal support. To the extent the
marital relationship is characterized as a primarily romantic
one, neither specific performance nor damages provide an appro-
priate remedy.177 Finally, even if these problems could be over-
come, Cohen provides no basis for evaluating the wisdom of
such an approach. The "losses" Cohen attributes to the failure
to deter male strategic behavior are the losses Becker attributes
to decreasing specialization-"underinvestment" in marriage,
children, and homemaking. Yet, Cohen, like Becker, makes no
attempt to weigh those losses against the benefits from increas-
ing workforce participation by married women. Accordingly,
while Cohen's analysis raises issues of equity between men and
women, it is significant in the efficiency terms he addresses only
when coupled with Becker's advocacy of traditional gender
roles.
Herma Hill Kay, writing from a "liberal feminist" perspec-
174. This is another way of saying that the lost opportunity to have married another
is more significant for women than for men because men are better able to recoup those lost
opportunities through remarriage. Moreover, since the loss in this case is the
companionship from the marriage, compensation for lost career opportunities and other
restitution style awards would be inadequate. Only a contract measure defined in terms of
expectation-as a surrogate for the opportunities lost in the form of other opportunities to
marry-would appropriately compensate for this loss. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5,
at 873-77.
175. England and Farkas argue that the tendency of older men to marry younger
women is at least in part a result of the traditional exchange of economic security (better
provided by older than younger men) for domestic services (with childbearing and sexual
attractiveness more associated with younger than older women). P. ENGLAND & G.
FARKAS, supra note 84, at 57.
176. Cohen, supra note 10, at 303.
177. Id at 271. The traditional response to this dilemma was to deter divorce
without any pretext of precisely calculating the value of marriage. See id at 289-90.
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rive, 178 takes the position most diametrically opposed to that of
the Chicago School economists. Concerned about equality
rather than efficiency, 79 Kay argues that women will never be
equal with men so long as they continue to "make choices that
will be economically disabling for women, thereby perpetuating
their traditional financial dependence upon men and contribut-
ing to their inequality with men at divorce.'80 Kay further
observes that:
since... Anglo-American family law has traditionally reflected
the social division of function by sex within marriage, it will be
necessary to withdraw existing legal supports for that arrange-
ment as a cultural norm. No sweeping new legal reforms of
marriage and divorce will be required, however, to achieve this
end. It will be enough, I think, to continue the present trend
begun in the nineteenth century toward the emancipation of
married women, and implemented more recently by gender-
neutral family laws, as well as the current emphasis on sharing
principles in marital property law.' 8
Kay concludes that the law, far from encouraging specialization
in gender roles, should discourage it. She agrees with Becker
and Cohen 'that the most effective way to encourage women's
economic independence is to fail to compensate choices that lead
to economic marginalization. She therefore opposes the re-
introduction of fault in any form, and by implication, contract-
based awards, both because she wishes to discourage women
from pursuing the traditional homemaking role and because of
concern that even if fault-based awards produced higher settle-
ments for women, that outcome might not be "worth the cost of
perpetuating the blackmail and other abuses that accompanied
the fault system."18s2 Kay is equivocal on the subject of restitu-
178. The terminology, as we explained supra note 138, is borrowed from Robin West.
179. Kay would almost certainly reject Becker's definition of efficiency as well. While
Kay, drawing on the work of Kathleen Gough, observes that the "lengthy period of
dependence of the human infant serves as the basis for an efficient division of labor within
the family by function, if not by sex, even today," she concludes that a "strategy for
childrearing that will bind both fathers and mothers to the nurturance of the child seems
better suited to its growth and development under modem conditions in which the child's
natal family is less frequently the unit in which it reaches maturity." Kay, supra note 11, at
82-84 (footnotes omitted).
180. Id at 80.
181. Id at 86.
182. Id at 76-77. Kay also questions whether fault-based awards would in fact be
higher. The data she cites, however, compares awards in the states that continue to list
fault as a potential ground for divorce with states that have abolished fault as a
consideration in granting divorces. Id at 67. Kay is certaintly correct that the adoption of
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tion-based awards, favoring compensation for the lost career
opportunities of older dependent homemakers while opposing
support for women who make "economically disabling" choices
in the future.18 3  Identifying child-care responsibilities as the
major source of continued sexual inequality, Kay believes that
men should be encouraged to share responsibility for the rearing
of their children, receiving joint custody upon divorce and
remaining emotionally and financially involved thereafter. She
believes that if this is accomplished, the "large disparity between
men's and women's household standard of living that Weitzman
discovered... should be greatly reduced" and "the trend begun
in California toward eliminating fault from all aspects of marital
dissolution can continue to work itself out without the risk of
financial harm to dependent women and children." 184
Taken to its logical conclusion, Kay's analysis suggests that
the appropriate response to women's dependence on their hus-
bands' incomes is less, not more, financial support upon divorce.
In order to dismantle the gendered division of labor within the
family, Kay argues that the marital bargain, at least the tradi-
tional one that exchanges male support for female services,
should not be enforceable. 815 Her analysis further implies that
compensation for lost career opportunities, at least for modem
women who make choices that are "economically disabling,"
no-fault grounds for divorce is not itself the cause of low divorce awards, but a truer test of
the role of fault in the new era would be a comparison of awards in states that require
consideration of marital misconduct in the financial allocation made upon divorce with
awards in states that bar such consideration.
Kay further disputes Weitzman's contention that the adoption of no-fault grounds for
divorce has exacerbated the problems of women in Weitzman's four particularly "unjust"
cases: (1) dependent children, impoverished because of inadequate or unenforceable child
support orders; (2) older, financially dependent homemakers without paid employment
experience outside the home; (3) mothers burdened with sole custody of small children; and
(4) women who sacrifice their own financial well-being to contribute to their husband's
career. Id. at 63-75. Again, Kay is correct that divorce awards could be justified in all four
cases on both fault (for example, contract) or no-fault (for example, restitution) grounds,
and therefore the problems that Weitzman identifies cannot be attributed solely or even
primarily to no-fault divorce. Nonetheless, neither Kay nor Weitzman focus on the "hard"
cases, in which consideration of fault would be expected to have more of an impact, such as
those involving a substantial disparity of income between husband and wife after a long-
term marriage in which there are no children and the husband's career was established
before the marriage. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at 891-92. In addition, while
both fault and no-fault grounds for adjustment exist in all four cases, the amount of
compensation due might well differ. See id at 878 nn.96-105, 892 & nn.148-50.
183. See Kay, supra note 11, at 79-80; see also Kay, supra note 96, at 315-16.
184. Kay, supra note 11, at 86-87.
185. To Kay, therefore, fault is irrelevant.
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should also be limited. 8 6 In states that preclude consideration
of fault, lost career opportunities are emerging as the primary
basis for spousal support. 1 7 Compensation for those lost oppor-
tunities, however, sanctions the very choices of which Kay so
strongly disapproves: namely, decisions by modem women to
forego substantial career opportunities in order to contribute to
the care of their children or their husband's careers.'88  Kay
issues no call for a reduction in divorce awards, but such a call is
unnecessary. Her endorsement, albeit qualified,'8 9 of the present
divorce system, which Lenore Weitzman depicts as a system of
transitional awards that falls far short of compensating the
186. See Kay, supra note 11, at 80.
187. See Ellman, supra note 2, at 53-65; Krauskopf, supra note 150, at 265-68;
Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 265; O'Kelly, supra note 151, at 228-30; see also Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 5, at 877-82, 887-89.
188. As we noted above, Kay is equivocal as to the extent to which she supports
compensation for lost career opportunities. She specifically embraces such an analysis only
for the two groups in which it is least at issue: (1) the older wife, divorced after a lengthy
marriage in which she forewent "her own economic self-development in order to devote
herself to the role of a full-time homemaker and mother... in the context of strong
cultural expectations that such choices were proper ones for married women," namely,
women who, because of the pervasive sex discrimination of the time, enjoyed limited career
prospects in the first place; and, (2) the younger spouse, contributing to the mate's
acquisition of a professional degree, where lost career opportunities may be one aspect of a
larger contribution. Kay, supra note 96, at 315-16; see also Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5,
at 873-74, 881-82 n.107.
Lost career opportunity analysis carries its greatest force, however, when applied to
modem women who forego promising career prospects to care for their children. See id at
877-80. Yet, Kay states that she does "not believe that we should encourage future couples
entering marriages to make choices that will be economically disabling for women." Kay,
supra note 11, at 80. Presumably, therefore, while Kay believes it is necessary to "alleviate
the situation of those women who are trapped in circumstances neither they nor their
husbands anticipated," she sees no similar need to relieve those who enjoyed other choices.
Id at 79-80. As a practical matter, the more promising the career prospects foregone, the
less Kay is inclined to protect them.
Within this context, there is an important distinction between the permanent
subordination of the wife's career to the husband's (for example, a doctor's wife who
foregoes paid employment after her husband finishes his residency) and temporary
sacrifices made to facilitate the husband's advancement (for example, a doctor's wife who
postpones graduate education in order to support the family while the husband is in
medical school). While the permanent subordination of the wife's career to the husband's
will render her economically dependent, temporary sacrifices, made on behalf of husband
or wife, may be quite consistent with economic equality. Divorce awards designed to
compensate for accidents of timing, for example when the divorce occurs after she has
contributed to his medical degree but before she has reaped any of the anticipated benefits,
need not perpetuate a traditional division of gender roles, particularly when the award is to
be used to permit the wife to proceed with her interrupted education or career
development. For Kay's discussion of these types of awards, see Kay, supra note 96, at
315.
189. For Kay's proposals for reform, see Kay, supra note 96, at 310-19.
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career sacrifices modem women are continuing to make, 190 has
much the same effect.191
Kay's central premise is that in order to achieve equality,
men and women need to make the same choices. Women need
to join men in the pursuit of careers; men need to join women in
caring for their children. "Cultural feminists" or "feminists of
difference," influenced by the ideology of Carol Gilligan and the
sociology of Lenore Weitzman, question whether women should
make the same decisions as men and oppose laws that penalize
women's different choices. 92  Mary O'Connell, employing the
categories developed by Martha Fineman, poses the challenge
directly:
[The] issue is this: the vast majority of American women live
what can only be fairly described as a feminine lifestyle. They
undertake the major-and sometimes sole-responsibility for
190. Kay describes an important objective of the existing divorce system as
permitting the couple to rebuild their own lives after divorce. She observes:
Divorce, after all, is a legal declaration that frees both spouses to seek new
relationships. The financial consequences of divorce may have a more severe
immediate impact on women than on men, but over time women are more likely
to experience an improved quality of life following divorce than are men.... The
financial settlement should have as its goal not only security for children, but also
opportunity for growth for their parents.
Id at 318.
191. See Kay, supra note 11, at 85; Kay, supra note 96, at 318. See generally L.
WErrZMAN, supra note 105. Kay acknowleges that "[a]s Weitzman has shown in such
dramatic detail, women and children have borne the brunt of the transition that took place
in California's legal regulation of the family between 1970 and 1987." Kay, supra note 96,
at 319. While Kay describes this as "unfortunate and unnecessary," presumably because
she believes traditional homemakers should have been treated more generously under
existing law, some transitional impact is inevitable under Kay's analysis. If women are to
be persuaded to make different choices by "withdraw[ing] existing legal supports for that
arrangement [the social division of function by sex within marriage]," then presumably
they will be persuaded by the adverse economic consequences that they suffer or that they
see other women suffering. Kay, supra note 11, at 85.
192. Joan Williams observes:
In the 1980's two phenomena have. shifted feminists' attention from
assimilationists' focus on how individual women are like men to a focus on
gender differences, on how women as a group differ from men as a group. The
first is the feminization of poverty, which dramatizes the chronic and increasing
economic vulnerability of women. Feminists now realize that the assimilationists'
traditional focus on gender-neutrality may have rendered women more vulnerable
to certain gender-related disabilities that have important economic consequences.
The second 'phenomenon that plays a central role in the current feminist
imagination is that of career women "choosing" to abandon or subordinate their
careers so they can spend more time with their small children. These phenomena
highlight the fact that deep-seated social differences continue to encourage men
and women to make different choices with respect to work and family.
Williams, supra note 57, at 798-99 (footnotes omitted).
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rearing children, and interrupt or scale down their participa-
tion in the paid labor force in order to do so. At divorce, how-
ever, this lifestyle choice is either minimized (equality theory)
or treated as deviant (victim theory). A woman is either told
that she must accept the consequences of her choice and go on,
or her husband is ordered to "repair" part of the "damage" his
wife has suffered, so that she can be fully self-supporting (that
is, function like a man) in the future.193
O'Connell further notes:
If our model for the correct post divorce result is equal
lifestyles, and if we begin to recognize that it is not only years
absent from the labor force but also the presence of children
which compromise one's ability to earn a living at paid work,
we may begin to move toward a model which insists that the
parent who devotes herself to childrearing must not end up in a
worse position than the one who devotes himself to the labor
force.... We need a new model, a model which does not treat
the uncompensated rearing of children as aberrant, a model
which sees women as women, but does not rush either to pro-
tect or to penalize them on that basis. 194
O'Connell reaches the "unpopular conclusion" that women will
continue to be more likely than men to compromise labor force
participation in order to rear their children and that, rather than
dissuade them, the childrearing role must be made "less eco-
nomically perilous."' 195 To do so, O'Connell advocates "an aug-
mented role for alimony in the middle-class divorces of the
future.' ' 1
96
While O'Connell may disagree with Kay about the desired
extent of women's contributions to childrearing, she shares her
rejection of a fault standard as a way to secure greater economic
security for women. O'Connell, like other feminists of differ-
ence, wishes to encourage greater appreciation for "feminine"
values without a return to economic dependence on men or mar-
riage. The traditional marital exchange of lifelong support for
lifelong services locked women into a relationship in which they
were dependent on their husbands' income to maintain their
standard of living. Fault served to restrain men from leaving or
193. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 500.
194. Id at 507-08 (footnotes omitted).
195. Id at 507.
196. Id at 506. O'Connell, like most modern w-.ters, is generally critical of what she
terms the "make whole" model that treats the wife L. "an innocent victim deserving of
protection and recompense" without specifically considering the role breach of marital
obligations could play as part of a modern justification for expanded alimony. Id at 489.
1991] 997
TULANE LAW REVIEW
flouting their marital obligations too egregiously, but it also left
women with little bargaining power within the relationship. 197
Women dissatisfied with their mates or their mates' behavior
could not leave--or effectively threaten to leave-without facing
financial ruin.198
To be effective in achieving O'Connell's objectives, any new
system must encourage women's, economic independence with-
out penalizing their devotion to their children. O'Connell her-
self sets forth no specific suggestions, but other writers propose
two broad categories of reform. The first, which we will call
restitution based, would formalize and expand the existing trend
toward basing divorce awards on the gains and losses of the mar-
riage. This approach, pioneered by Joan Krauskopf 199 and
recently set forth in a different form by Ira Ellman, °0 declares
that compensation is due any time a marriage ends with one
spouse retaining a benefit at the other spouse's expense. If, for
example, the wife accepts a lower paying job to be able to spend
more time with the children, the couple has, in effect, decided to
finance their childrearing efforts through the wife's foregone
income. At divorce, both parents will retain the benefit of hav-
ing had children or of having raised them in a particular way,
but only the wife will bear the cost. Similarly, if one spouse
finances the other's medical education and the divorce occurs
197. See generally P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAs, supra note 84.
198. Victor Fuchs observes:
Consider a couple who are bargaining (explicitly or implicitly) over how the
household's income will be spent and how household chores will be allocated.
Game theory assumes that, other things being held constant, the strength of each
participant in the bargaining situation will depend on how well off each would be
if they fail to reach agreement-in this case, if they divorce. (Game theory is a
theoretical approach to interactive decision making, used in economics to analyze
situations where prices and quantities are the outcome of bargaining by individual
participants, rather than the automatic result of a competitive market.) The
stronger the individual's situation outside marriage, the stronger his or her
bargaining position within marriage.... When her alternative as a divorced
woman is better, her bargaining position-and her well-being-as a married
woman is also improved.
V. FUCHS, supra note 84, at 71 (emphasis in original).
199. Krauskopf's work was heavily influenced by the economics-of-the-family
literature. See Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 386; see also Krauskopf, supra note 150, at
299; Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 260-68.
200. This is not to say that Krauskopf would necessarily agree with Ellman's
proposals, only that they are both examples of a restitution approach. See Krauskopf,
supra note 13, at 273 n.72, 274 n.76. Moreover, Ellman advances a justification for his
proposals very similar to Becker's without recognizing either the restitution nature of his
proposals or the fact that they cannot advance the interests he identifies. Compare Becker,
supra note 104, at 1151-77 with Ellman, supra note 2, at 24-28, 40-53.
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shortly after graduation, the doctor will reap the entire benefit of
an investment the couple jointly undertook and paid for.2"1 In
both cases, an adjustment will be due that goes beyond more
conventional provisions for property division or spousal sup-
port.20 2 Krauskopf identifies a strong trend toward the adoption
201. There is a complex relationship between the loss foregone and the resulting gain
described in the economic literature on restitution. Basically, we take the position that the
loss may be compensated on a restitution rather than a reliance basis so long as it
corresponds to a resulting gain. Economists argue that there will be such a correspondence
to the extent that we can assume that a rational couple, in choosing to have the mother care
for the children, values the benefit from the mother's services at least as much as the
foregone income. While the benefit from the children and the mother's particular
childrearing practices will always be intangible, the income foregone becomes a surrogate
measure of the gain once we assume that the benefit must be at least as great as the loss.
Accordingly, the principle at the core of these proposals is compensation for the
enrichment even though much of the discussion is cast in terms of the loss. The literature
that attempts to link marital roles and divorce reform is discussed in Part III of this
Article. See sources cited supra note 1.
202. The distinction between property divisions and spousal support has been blurred
by the conflation of what should be two separate questions: (1) whose property is it? and
(2) for what purposes shall the property be used? At common law, the courts determined
property ownership in accordance with title or with the spouse's respective financial
contributions. Alimony served as a continuation of the husband's duty of support and as a
liquidated form of property distribution in a system in which the husband was awarded the
bulk, indeed often all, of the family property. See Johnston, supra note 72, at 1089 &
n.141; see also infra note 211.
Contemporaneously with the enactment of no-fault grounds for divorce, divorce
reformers fought for greater recognition of homemakers' contributions. As Herma Hill
Kay explains, the reformers argued that the courts should start with a presumption
favoring an equal division of the property in recognition of the homemaker's independent
economic contribution to the acquisition of the family property (that is, a theory that says
the property belongs to both of them because they equally contributed to its acquisition),
not as compensation for the services rendered (that is, not a theory that the property is
really his because he paid for it, but that he should give some to her in compensation for the
services she performed for his benefit during the marriage). Kay, supra note 11, at 50-51.
The reformers also argued that property, rather than alimony, should be used whenever
possible to address a dependent spouse's financial need. Id at 47. In theory, such a
practice requires the two determinations described above: (1) whose property is it?
(presuming a 50/50 division of the property acquired during the marriage), and (2) will the
divorce (including the property division) leave one of the spouses in need? If so, the courts
should adjust the division of property beyond a 50/50 split to provide for that need or, if
there is insufficient property to do so, award maintenance. Few observers believe that the
property division has ever been handled in this matter, and most also believe that a need
standard, at least one designed to insure only that divorced spouses stay off the welfare
rolls, is inadequate. See Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 273-75. Reynolds, in particular,
argues that property division has rarely been used to address need, and that it ordinarily
reflects contribution alone. Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 840-41 (1988); cf
Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 274 (arguing that courts probably do consider need, but value
contributions unequally).
Dissatisfaction with the need standard and with the paucity of property accumulated
in most marriages has prompted greater interest in the concept of lost career opportunities
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of this rationale as the primary purpose of support awards.2 3
O'Connell, while viewing these proposals as improvements
over the earlier reforms, is nonetheless dissatisfied because resti-
tution awards still place a premium on labor market investments
rather than domestic investments. °4 She observes that such pro-
as a justification for divorce awards. Id. at 263. Such awards may take the form of either
property settlements or support payments, further confusing the distinction between the
two. See, eg., id at 253; H. CLARK, supra nbte 47, at 449-52.
Keeping the two determinations identified above separate should help clarify matters.
Consider the following hypothetical:
Husband and wife, both engineers, forego outside income during the marriage to
operate a high tech start up firm. Both contribute equally to the initial capital
needed to start the business and the couple have no other substantial assets. The
husband is the CEO and acquires valuable managerial experience. The wife keeps
the books, partly because it gives her greater flexibility to care for the couples'
children and partly because it is the work most needed at the time. At the
divorce, the couple sells the business. The husband finds a managerial job with
another company while the wife's prospects are limited to bookkeeping positions
less lucrative than either the engineering position she held before the marriage or
her husband's job opportunities.
Elhman, supra note 2, at 63 n.160. Viewed as a property matter, the spouses' respective
interests in the proceeds from the sale should be valued equally because both parties con-
tributed to the venture's success. While, on a market basis, the husband's managerial serv-
ices would be valued more highly than his wife's bookkeeping efforts, her contributions to
the firm should be combined with her domestic contributions (that is, he could combine his
managerial contributions with parenthood only because of the greater responsbility she
assumed for the children). Given the impossibility of assigning a market value to her
domestic responsibilities, the parties' respective contributions should be presumed to be
equal unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. After the proceeds of the sale are
split, however, further consideration should be given to the fact that the division of labor
within the marriage gave the husband both children and enhanced earning capacity while it
left the wife with children and a reduced earning potential. The husband should owe the
wife restitution for that additional benefit. The restitution award could take the form of a
support order or an unequal division of the proceeds from the sale of the business.
Suppose, however, that instead of selling the business, the husband kept'it and oper-
ated it as his sole source of income. At divorce, the wife, employing the same logic used
above, would be entitled to half the value of the business. So long as the business was
valued in a way that reflected half of the present value of the earning stream that the
business was expected to generate (this is a conventional economic definition of value), the
wife would be entitled to no further compensation even though her future income will be
substantially less than her husband's. In this second example, any additional compensation
for the wife's lost earning capacity would be double counting because the enhanced income
the wife's sacrifices made possible is already taken into account in the valuation of the
business. For a discussion of the restitution basis of these awards, see Carbone, supra note
13, at 1477-80, 1484 n.89.
203. Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 265.
204. O'Connell also criticizes these proposals because they employ the victim
imagery she deplores. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 501-03. The victim imagery, the
characterization of these proposals as compensation for women's inability to realize the
financial benefits of a male lifestyle, however, results at least in part from confusion
between reliance and restitution. To the extent such proposals are intended to redress lost
career opportunities, with or without a corresponding benefit to the other spouse, the
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posals reserve their greatest benefits for women who abandon
established careers2 5 and concludes:
The theory seems incapable of capturing the subtler effects of
the adoption of a feminine lifestyle. It does not, for example,
address the fact that the wife may well have chosen her earlier
work with an eye to interrupted or reduced labor force partici-
pation during her childrearing years. Flexibility may have out-
weighed remuneration or potential for advancement as a value
to be maximized in choosing a job. No formulation of human
capital theory captures the impact of this choice. Yet, by
ignoring it, the model is, in effect, applying a masculine tem-
plate to a feminine lifestyle, the contours of which it does not
even begin to discern.2 6
While. O'Connell's feminine lifestyle does not involve the lifelong
separation of home and market, it does embrace decisions, with
lifelong consequences, to value family above individual advance-
ment. O'Connell insists on protection not just for well-educated
women who delay childrearing long enough to establish careers,
but for women who marry young and invest less in their educa-
tion and in the acquisition of marketable skills than in their
search for a suitable mate. She objects not to these choices, but
to the economic powerlessness that comes with them.207
O'Connell accordingly sees more promise in the recent
efforts to use a partnership model to equalize post-divorce stan-
dards of living.208 Jana Singer, writing after O'Connell, proposes
proposals are reliance based and reliance is inherently victim oriented. See supra notes 25-
26 and accompanying text. To the extent, however, that these proposals employ lost career
opportunities as a surrogate measure of the more intangible benefits gained from the
children or from the other spouse's freedom to pursue his career without domestic
interruptions, the proposals are restitution based and they depend on recognition of an
obligation to pay for the benefit rather than on the need to compensate the loss. While the
recovery may be the same in either case, the symbolism involved should be quite different.
See Carbone, supra note 13, at 1500.
205. Ellman's proposals are an excellent case in point. He would base alimony
awards primarily on a spouse's ability to demonstrate lost earning potential. See Ellman,
supra note 2, at 78-80. Other writers who favor basing awards on lost earning capacity
would nonetheless allow a more relaxed burden of proof. See Carbone, supra note 13, at
1497-99. To the extent that such awards compensate women for premarital decisions to
forego college or to become a school teacher rather than a machinist because of the more
flexible hours, however, it is harder to establish a restitution basis for such compensation.
See supra notes 29 & 199.
206. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 503.
207. Id. at 507. Radical feminists are likely to agree with much of O'Connell's
critique without necessarily concluding that women, freed from a patriarchal structure,
would continue to make the choices in the same way. See, eg., C. MACKINNON, supra
note 42, at 220-22.
208. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 507-08.
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that
each ex-spouse would be entitled to an equal share of the
couple's combined income for a set number of years after the
formal dissolution of their marriage. The time period for this
post-divorce sharing would depend upon the length of the mar-
riage. I would propose, as a starting point, one year of post-
divorce income sharing for each two years of marriage.2 ' 9
Singer's justification for these proposals, like the earlier use of
property division to address need,21 0 conflates two separate
determinations. 211  First, whose income is it? In invoking the
concept of economic partnership, Singer suggests that the post-
divorce disparity in earning power is a reflection of the couple's
investment decisions and that the higher earning spouse's
income is at least to some degree theirs, not just his or hers.212
Second, for what purposes will income adjustments be made?
Singer emphasizes the ability of her proposal to provide compen-
sation for lost career opportunties, to advance the purposes of
rehabilitative alimony, and to address need without explaining
the relationship between these purposes and the determination
of whose income it is in the first place.21 3 The partnership
209. Singer, supra note 114, at 1117-18 (footnote omitted); see also Rutherford, supra
note 29, at 577-84; Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests Upon Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130-65 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990). Although
Singer suggests this standard as "a starting point," she strongly argues for limiting judicial
discretion. Singer, supra note 114, at 1119.
210. See discussion supra note 202.
211. Joan Krauskopf, in her thoughtful examination of the distinctions between
property divisions and spousal support, describes two separate adjustments to be made: "1)
sharing the asset accumulation to which both contributed and 2) sharing at least the loss
resulting from the transfer of earning capacity." Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 273.
212. Singer, supra note 114, at 1117-18. Indeed, some commentators have argued for
expanded definitions of property to include career assets, but, with the exception of New
York, such efforts have largely failed. For a review of these developments, see Krauskopf,
supra note 13, at 260-61. In discussing proposals similar to Singer's, Sugarman discusses
the comingling of the parties' income-producing interests rather than the need to adjust for
lost career opportunities as the basis for the proposals. Sugarman, supra note 209.
Rutherford, in proposing what she terms "income sharing," rejects the idea of adjustment
for prior contributions, stating instead
Income sharing is not based on need, pre-divorce standard of living, prior
contributions or fault. Instead, it represents a conscious effort to achieve equality
between spouses who have divided their labors during marriage. If spouses have
not divided the labor, either because they were not married long enough, or
because they did not have children, then income sharing should not apply.
Rutherford, supra note 29, at 578.
213. Singer, supra note 114, at 1118-19. If a partnership proposal were to address
these issues directly, it would resemble the restitution model described above in the most
stereotypical cases. Consider the following example:
Two M.B.A.'s marry shortly after graduation from business schools and have
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model, in short, embraces the existing justifications for expanded
property divisions and spousal support, while eschewing any
effort to achieve precise calculations.214
While the justifications advanced for the partnership model
are conventional ones, the symbolic consequences are quite dif-
ferent from those of the other models. Partnership proponents
will not satisfy the traditionalists because they refuse to embrace
what Becker calls "the sharp sexual division of labor in all socie-
ties between the market and the household sectors" or the life-
time commitment necessary, in Becker's view, to make that
division possible.215 At the same time, the partnership approach
comparable jobs during the early years of their marriage. He is soon working 60
hour weeks in positions that take him up the corporate ladder. She scales back
her hours after the children are born, taking less demanding, parttime positions
that offer little promise of advancement. They divorce after 15 years of marriage.
He is making $200,000 a year. She is making $60,000 and has custody of the
children.
In this case, it is reasonable to assume that most of the income disparity is explained by her
childrearing responsibilities. Accordingly, the result is the same whether the case is ana-
lyzed in terms of her lost earning potential (she would be making $200,000 a year but for
the children); his gain (he could have his 60-hour-a-week executive position and well-cared
for children only because of her efforts); or a sharing of post-divorce income. For an exam-
ination of the results in less stereotypical cases, see infra note 214.
214. Precisely for this reason, the most troubling consequences of a partnership
approach are for those couples who do not conform to either the traditional breadwinner/
homemaker stereotype or the more modern model of the full-time worker/part-time parent
married to the part-time worker/full-time parent. Consider the partnership model's
division of income in the following cases:
1. Construction worker marries beautician and they have two children. He, the
construction worker, drinks heavily, works sporadically, and verbally abuses his wife and
children. She supports the family and assumes full responsibility for the house and the
children. After ten years of marriage, she makes $25,000 a year and he makes $12,000.
2. Two college students marry upon graduation. She defers her plans to attend
medical school so that she can support his medical education. They divorce four years
later. At the time of the divorce, he has just begun a three year residency paying $20,000 a
year. She is making $25,000 per year. His income following the residency will exceed
$100,000 per year.
3. Two skilled machinists earning comparable incomes marry. She is bored by the
work and becomes an art instructor. He helps finance her education and the acquisition of
the materials she needs to set up her business. They have no children and they equally
share cooking and cleaning responsibilities. They divorce after eight years of marriage. At
that time, he is making $40,000 a year and she is making $20,000 per year.
4. Movie director making several million dollars a year marries aspiring actress with
income in six figures. They are married for twelve years and have no children. Her career
has been enhanced by her relationship to him and at the time of the divorce she averages a
million a year. His career is at its height. He made $20 million in the year preceding the
divorce and expects to make comparable amounts over the next few years. Their
community property exceeds $80 million with most of it attributable to his directing
success.
215. See G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 21. These proposals, however, would
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eschews the liberals' insistence that women be encouraged to
look to their own careers rather than to their husbands as the
primary source of financial security.216 Rather, because these
models reserve their greatest benefits for the marriages with the
greatest income disparity and do so independently of any actual
contribution made, the proposals validate not just decisions to
value children over individual advancement, but marriage over
career, and the search for a financially attractive mate over
investment in one's own earning capacity.217 Partnership mod-
els, in their effort to make women's choices less disabling, also
make the traditional role more comfortable.
constitute a greater deterrent to divorce than current law. Higher earning spouses could
not extinguish their marital obligations as readily as under existing law. Lower earning
spouses, while granted greater financial security than they enjoy now, would still be
foregoing, if they decided to seek a divorce, the greater access to their spouse's income that
a longer marriage would insure.
216. Reconsider the M.B.A. example given supra note 213. Suppose that instead of
marrying another M.B.A., the husband marries a 20-year-old high school graduate who
has been working as a secretary and who becomes a full-time homemaker after the children
are born. After 15 years of marriage, he is making $200,000 a year, and she can get another
secretarial job at $18,000 per year. Under the partnership analysis, the court would divide
their combined incomes, and they would receive $109,000 a year each for the next seven
and a half years.
Under a narrow restitution approach, the court would measure the benefit conferred
on the husband (the ability to have children and a career dependent on being able to work
60 hours a week) by the cost of acquiring it (her foregone earning potential). That cost
would be determined in accordance with whatever opportunities she had at the time the
decision was made, namely, her earning potential as a secretary, unless she can demonstrate
that she was about to start college or otherwise switch jobs.
Under a broader lost-career-opportunities approach, the court would consider not
only the job she held at the time she became pregnant, but the career choices she might
have made had she not looked to marriage rather than to her own earnings for her financial
well-being. Since there is no way to determine what she might have done in those
circumstances, some courts assume that, but for her reliance on marriage, her financial
position would have been comparable to her husband's. See, ag., In re Marriage of Yantis,
52 Or. App. 825, 629 P.2d 883 (1981). Using this approach, the partnership model and a
lost-career-opportunities model would produce similar results.
These results, however, raise two questions applicable to either model. First, to what
extent should the husband be responsible for decisions his wife made before they ever met?
The wife's decision not to attend college may have had a greater impact on her earning
potential than her decision to leave her secretarial position. Second, to the extent these
models will encourage women to continue to think in terms of marriage rather than career,
is there a societal interest in encouraging them to do so?
217. Ironically, Singer justifies this model on the ground that it insists "on substantial
post-divorce sharing of income without invoking the harmful stereotypes that underlie
traditional alimony doctrine." She then argues that the proposal is appropriate because it
"affirms the social value of childrearing and other domestic labor" and "equalize[s] the
financial consequences of these gender-linked marital investment decisions." Singer, supra
note 114, at 1118.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. Breaking the Impasse: The Role of Children
Both Henna Hill Kay and Mary O'Connell discuss legal
proposals that, at most, involve incremental changes in the fam-
ily order. Underlying their respective visions, however, are
potentially dramatic implications for the nature of human
relationships.
The central premise of the liberal feminist critique of the
relationships between men and women is that women's chil-
drearing role stands in the way of full equality.218 Victor Fuchs
argues, however, that it is not the fact that women raise chil-
dren, but the fact "that, on average, women have a stronger
demand for children than men do, and have more concern for
children after they are born," that creates the disadvantage.2 19
Fuchs observes:
Suppose women were better than men at producing and caring
for children but had no particular desire to do so, while it was
the men who wanted the children and cared more about their
welfare. We would probably still see the same division of labor
we see now, but men would have to pay dearly for women's
services. The present hierarchy of power would be reversed.220
Instead, women, on average, are more willing than men to sacri-
fice their own well-being to have children and to protect the
interests of their children.221 The result is that men individually
and society generally are able to have children at a lower price
than the price they would have to pay if women's preferences
were the same as men's.
The liberal feminist strategy of withdrawing support for the
maternal childrearing role is aimed at changing these prefer-
ences. 222 While the liberal ideal may be shared parenting,223 the
immediate effect of higher divorce rates and low divorce awards
is to convince women that they make sacrifices for their children
at their own peril. Later marriages and fewer middle-class chil-
218. See, eg., Kay, supra note 11, at 80-81.
219. V. FucHs, supra note 84, at 68. Women also assume greater responsibility for
the care of other relatives. See, eg., Trading Places: The Daughter Track, NEWSWEEK,
July 16, 1990, at 48.
220. V. FUCHS, supra note 84, at 68.
221. Id at 68-73; Weiss & Wilis, Children As Collective Goods in Divorce
Settlements, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 268, 276 (1985).
222. Kay, supra note 11, at 85.
223. Id at 80-85.
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dren are predictable consequences of that strategy. 224 When
combined with the Reagan-era cutbacks in the resources avail-
able for poorer families, the result is a dramatically increasing
percentage of American children raised in poverty, with a con-
comitant effect on their performance and well-being.225 Yet all
of the demographic data indicate that the demand for relatively
well-educated workers will be increasing in the future.226
If the result of this strategy is to persuade women to value
children less, then men who want children of their own may
have to give up more to have them. Or there may simply be
fewer children. At that point, society generally should have a
greater interest in encouraging investment in children, mandat-
ing more generous parental leave, subsidizing child care, provid-
ing tax breaks, increasing educational resources, and otherwise
assisting childcare providers.227 Or the United States could meet
its labor force demands by selectively increasing immigration.
Whichever result occurs, the price for children will be
higher. But women will no longer pay such a disproportionate
share of the price. In the interim, however, women and their
children will bear the major burden of the transition.228 For the
liberal strategy to succeed, the disparity between men and
women's preferences for children must change. They are more
likely to change if society withdraws its support for the tradi-
tional maternal role. The economic consequences Lenore Weitz-
man chronicles are therefore a prerequisite for liberal success.229
224. See discussion supra notes 130-3 1.
225. Fuchs observes: "The proportion of children living in poverty is almost double
that of adults: 20 percent versus 11 percent in 1986. This is an extraordinary situation; in
1960 and 1970 the poverty rate for children was only one-third above that of adults." V.
FucHs, supra note 84, at 107. Fuchs also cites studies demonstrating that performance on
scholastic aptitude tests declined markedly in the 1960s and 1970s, childhood obesity rose,
and the suicide rate for teenagers was two and one-half times as high as it was twenty years
earlier. Id at 104.
226. See, eg., How Europe Will Cope with Lag in Population, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Sept. 15, 1980, at 82; Anderson, World Population Growth Increases Immigration
Pressures, B.C. Cycle, Washington News, Jan. 16, 1990.
227. As Victor Fuchs points out, such policies would benefit women more than men
so long as women cared more about children than men did. V. FUCHS, supra note 84, at
71-72.
228. Herma Hill Kay recognizes the problems and voices her greatest support for
older wives who chose to devote themselves "to the role of full-time homemaker and
mother... in the context of strong cultural expectations that such choices were proper
ones for married women." Kay, supra note 96, at 316. Kay would not, however, provide
such support for modem women who make the same choices.
229. See L. WErrZMAN, supra note 119, at 164; Weitzman, supra note 119, at 1221-
31. This is not to say that Herma Hill Kay or other liberal feminists embrace the
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Cultural feminists, however much they may agree that the
greater value women place on children is the source of women's
lack of power, applaud such values.230  They are unwilling to
encourage women to value children less or to pay a penalty for
refusing to do so.23' For cultural feminists, therefore, greater
protection for the childrearing role is essential. The challenge
for these feminists is to persuade society to do so without perpet-
uating women's dependence, economic or psychological, on
men.
232
These divisions in feminist theory, an updated version of
the dichotomy Martha Finemen identified between woman as
equal and woman as victim, are unnecessarily accentuated by
the exclusive focus on divorcing husbands and wives.233 The his-
torical source of protection for childrearing has been marriages
that lock women into unequal relationships with their hus-
bands.234 To the extent that modem proposals continue to tie
support for the childrearing role to the husband's income and
the length of the marriage, they risk perpetuating women's
dependence. 235 A more radical strategy may be a child-centered
approach that separates support for childrearing from marital
roles and insists on greater recognition of both the societal and
the individual responsibility for children. Such a strategy would
conclusions in this analysis. We mean to say only that such conclusions are implicit in this
line of analysis. Individual writers may disagree with all or part of these proposals.
230. See, eg., O'Connell, supra note 2, at 507-08.
231. See B. FRIEDAN, supra note 137, at 98.
232. Radical feminists are likely to agree with liberal feminists in identifying
differences, including differences in the childrearing role, as a source of disparities in power,
and they are likely to agree with the cultural feminists in seeking to change those power
relationships without necessarily making women more like men. Radical feminists are
likely, however, to attribute less importance to motherhood and to give higher priority to
redressing the power relationship than are the cultural feminists. For a discussion of the
differences in perspective, see West, supra note 90, at 13-15.
233. This is a sin of which we too are guilty. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 5, at
857 n.4.
234. See G. BECKER, supra note 10, at 14-15; V. Fucss, supra note 84, at 71. Under
a fault-based system, a traditional homemaker's principal source of support was her
husband's income, and if she chose to leave an unhappy marriage without sufficiently
egregious conduct on the part of her mate, she could be deprived of all support. See Brinig
& Carbone, supra note 5, at 886-87 (discussing the change in West Virginia law on this
point).
235. They do so partly because, as we noted above, they continue to validate the
choice of marital partner as a source of financial security and partly because of the potential
effect on bargaining power within the marriage. Under Singer's partnership model, for
example, the higher earning spouse would have an incentive to terminate the marriage
earlier rather than later, while the lower earning spouse would have a financial incentive to
stay in the marriage as long as possible.
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emphasize: (1) increased societal support for day care, parental
leave, education, nutrition, medical care, and other subsidies
that directly benefit children and their primary caretakers; 236 (2)
allocation of property and post-divorce income for-the children's
benefit before the spouse's individual claims are considered;237
and (3) recognition of the parents' continuing responsibility for,
and benefit from, children as a primary basis for divorce adjust-
ments.238 While these principles can be combined with other
approaches, 23 9 and while they cannot and should not provide the
exclusive basis for the financial allocations made upon
divorce,m° we believe that emphasis on children and childrearing
236. See V. FUCHS, supra note 84, at 72.
237. See Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1555-65
(1984). See also Rutherford's proposals which advocate income sharing on a per capita
basis in order to take children's interests into account. Rutherford, supra note 29, at 578.
Better enforcement of such obligations is also essential.
238. In describing what we call the restitution approach, and what others have
described in terms of lost career opportunties, human capital, enhanced earning power,
rehabilitative alimony, and other terms, we believe the emphasis should be on the fact that,
in many divorces, one parent is able to retain the benefit involved from having had children
or having had them raised in a particular way without bearing a full share of the cost. That
the cost may be measured in terms of lost career opportunities should not obscure the fact
that the basis for compensation is retention of the benefit, not existence of the loss. We
would similarly insist on recognition that when the gain is the husband's ability to combine
parenthood with the professional success that comes with being able to devote 60 hours a
week to the job, the primary benefit is the children, not the enhanced income. Cf Ellman,
supra note 2, at 47-48; Carbone, supra note 13, at 1479, 1484; see also Murray, Improving
Parent-Child Relationships Within the Divorced Family: A Call for Legal Reform, 19 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 563 (1986).
To the extent that partnership proposals are similarly based on either contributions to
the higher earning spouse's career or the lower earning spouse's lost career opportunities,
we believe that the rationales should be recast in terms of parental benefits and obligations
arising from children.
239. The first two parts of this proposal are compatible with a liberal strategy because
they do not necessarily provide support for women who curtail their labor force
involvement because of parenthood. The insistence that the benefits from children be a
basis for adjustment at divorce does encourage career sacrifices made for the benefit of the
children.
Incorporation of these principles in a partnership approach would probably require
limiting the equal division of post-divorce income to marriage in which there were children
and in which the lower earning spouse bore more than half of the responsibility for
childrearing. Glendon observes that "childless and child-rearing marriages involve
different social, political and moral issues and should therefore be analyzed separately."
Glendon, supra note 237, at 1560.
240. The other two major considerations in divorce adjustments will be the
determination of what part of marital property and post-divorce income is joint as opposed
to separate property and the identification of benefits, such as professional degrees and
other forms of enchanced income or lifestyles, that will trigger compensation independently
of the presence of children. See discussion supra notes 201, 212.
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will do more to advance a feminist perspective than any exami-
nation limited to the relationship between husband and wife.
B. Marriage in the Future
Both the liberal feminist and the cultural feminist agendas
ultimately call for uncoupling marriage and childrearing. For
the traditionalists, children were what marriage was about, 241
and the marital exchange of lifelong support for lifelong services
served to encourage women to undertake childrearing and to
lock both parents into traditional gender roles once the choice
was made. The liberal feminists now wish to release women
from the primary childrearing role altogether, and the cultural
feminists seek to separate protection for childrearing from the
continuation of the marriage. The success of either agenda may
accelerate the existing trend away from the traditional family,
with more couples choosing not to have children, more children
being raised by single parents, and both men and women exper-
iencing a greater variety of parenting roles.
If support for childrearing were no longer dependent on
marriage, the question would remain open as to the role mar-
riage will play in the future. Joseph and Clorinda Margolis
observe:
Marriage increasingly tends to focus on the satisfaction of cer-
tain private interests, while family tends to focus on at least
some public concerns regarding the well-being of dependents,
the control of property, and the like. Why not, therefore, con-
sider what would be involved in construing marriage as essen-
tially concerned with such private interests, and families as
essentially concerned with public interests?...
Consider, then, the extreme possibility. If marriage were
a purely personal matter, the effective union of two (or even
several) persons (of either sex), the permanence of the relation-
ship would depend entirely on the feelings and volitions of the
parties affected. On that assumption, there would be absolutely
no point in linking property rights, inheritance, social position,
the "begetting and educating of children," and even the moni-
toring of sex or obligations of child support or the support of
spouses, with the institution of marriage.
241. The Catholic Church, which continues to embrace the traditionalist position,
stated in Humanae Vitae, "'Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained
toward the begetting and educating of children.'" Joseph & Clorinda Margolis, The
Separation of Marriage and Family, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 293 (M. Vetterling-
Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1978) (quoting Humanae Vitae).
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Two types of marriage would fit this extreme condition.
First of all, there could be an infonnal marriage, a personal
agreement to cohabit, not legally binding but socially (possibly
even religiously or sacramentally) recognized. Second, there
could be a term marriage, a legal agreement to cohabit for a
certain period; this would be for purposes of a private nature,
and renewable by mutual consent. 2
The Margolises, like Mary Ann Glendon243 and various other
writers, conclude that to the extent marriage no longer plays a
major societal role in childrearing, the control of property, and
the like, marriage becomes a matter of contract--contracts in
whose terms and in whose enforcement the state will have very
little interest. The result will be an increased variety of personal
relationships, all legally terminable at will unless the parties
specify otherwise, with the enforceability of marital agreements
that so specify very much an open question.2 "
For both liberal and cultural feminists, the unenforceability
of the traditional marital bargain may spur the new era of equal-
ity. But once childrearing is separated from marriage, feminists
will have to address again the nature of human relationships.
Are there lasting differences in the preferences of men and
women? Are women more likely than men to value commit-
ment above the freedom to leave, promises to form a lifelong
union above an agreement terminable at will, their husbands'
commitment to the children above their own economic indepen-
dence? If so, greater protection for children and childrearing
will only begin the process of rethinking marriage.
242. Id at 292-94 (emphasis in original).
243. See generally M. GLENDoN, supra note 1.
244. See generally Haas, supra note 158.
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